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Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty
to Disclose
JEFFREY D. BAUMAN*
In order to make responsible investment decisions investors must be
adequately informed. In this article Professor Bauman argues that
the existing disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws do
not meet the informational needs of investors because there is no
affirmative duty to disclose all material information. In order to fill
this substantial gap in the existing disclosure scheme, Professor
Bauman argues that rule lob-5 should be read to require prompt
disclosure of all material information subject only to limited excep-
tions and should be applicable even in the absence of trading or prior
inaccurate disclosure.
Corporations today live in an age of disclosure. Not only must they comply
with the formal disclosure requirements of federal securities laws,' but they
must also disclose to avoid liability under rule 1Ob-52 for trading on the basis
*Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Yale University 1959; M.A.,
Yale University 1962; LL.B., Yale Law School 1963.
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1. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n, 78o (1976) (requiring periodic
reports to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and disclosure in proxy statements and tender
offers) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act]; Securities Act of 1933, §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j,
77aa (1976) (requiring disclosure in registration statements and stock offering prospectus) [hereinafter
cited as 1933 Act].
Various rules have been adopted pursuant to these statutory provisions. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1,
240.13a-11, 240.13a-13 (1978) (requiring annual, current, and quarterly reports on forms provided by
SEC); 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308,249.308(a), 249.310 (1978) (specifying forms to be used for reports); 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.11 (1978) (specifying required disclosure in registration statement).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). The ruleprovides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the malls or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule lOb-5 is promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), which
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of nonpublic information 3 or failing to correct their previous misstatements.4
In addition, corporations disclose because they perceive that rule lOb-5 may
require them to do so even in the absence of trading or prior inaccurate
disclosure.
The parameters of some of these disclosure obligations are now reasonably
clear. The extent to which rule lob-5 imposes a duty to disclose in the absence
of trading or prior inaccurate disclosure, however, remains relatively un-
defined. 5 Although no case has so held, a few courts have suggested that there
is a general duty to disclose. 6 The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), while suggesting the existence of such a duty, has not embodied it in a
rule or administrative decision.7 Indeed, only the major stock exchanges
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963) (directors found to have exercised due
diligence in ascertaining and disclosing material facts when corporation purchased stock from minority
stockholder); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (corporation held liable for failing
to disclose material facts to shareholders of another corporation acquired in tender offer); cf. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding directors liable for trading on basis
of inside knowledge of mineral strike), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
4. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (corporation held liable
for issuing misleading press release), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). But cf. Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (no requirement that company correct
misstatement in press not attributable to it). See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD §
6.11, at 138.401 (1977) (liability for failure to correct and update public statements).
5. For convenience, this duty will be referred to in the balance of the article as the duty to disclose. The
duty to disclose has been discussed by various commentators, but few have attempted to analyze it fully.
See generally 1-4 A. BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 4.2, 5.2, 7.4, 8.2, 12.2-.6, at 69, 91, 165, 197, 267; 5 A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 §§ 87-94, at 4-1,-27 (rev. 1st ed. 1978); Feuerstein, The Corporation's
Obligation of Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws When It Is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15
N.Y.L.F. 385 (1969); Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule lOb-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation Have
an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DENVER L.J. 369 (1973). See also Bauman, Corporate Disclosure
and Dissemination, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE NEWS DISSEMINATION 63, 153-54
(1976) (Bibliography) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE NEwsDIsSEMINATION.
6. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (suggesting existence of affirmative
duty to disclose under lOb-5 even in the absence of trading), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Financial
Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam)
(dictum) (possible for plaintiff to prevail in lOb-5 action in absence of direct purchase or sale, insider
trading, or tipping by defendant), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90, 100, 102 (10th Cir.) (dictum) (when company has duty to correct rumor, insider trading not
required for lOb-5 private action), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (10b-5 intended to protect investors irrespective of insider trading),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
7. The SEC originally did not espouse a duty to disclose in the absence of trading. Cf. Brief of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 27, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969) (applicability of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 should not depend on trading by
corporation or its insiders if there has been widespread dissemination of affirmatively false or misleading
corporate statements); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur and the Duty of Disclosure, Another View, 55 GEo. L.J.
[Vol. 67:935
1979] AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
impose a general duty to disclose, and their requirements apply only to a
small fraction of all publicly held corporations.8 In addition, it is uncertain
whether a corporation has a duty to correct materially false and misleading
statements that it did not make. Similarly, it is unclear to what extent a
corporation must update its own prior statements that, although accurate
when made, have become materially misleading. The few cases that have
attempted to deal with these questions are marked by analytic uncertainty
and imprecision.
Recently, however, courts have shown a renewed interest in these prob-
lems. One court, in dicta, raised anew the question of the general duty to
disclose under rule 1Ob-5. 9 Another court recently held that a corporation
violated rule lOb-5 when it failed to update its own prior statements that had
become materially false and misleading over a period of time.10
This article explores the extent of a corporation's duty to disclose material
information. It asserts that rule lOb-5 requires prompt disclosure of all
material information even in the absence of trading or prior inaccurate
disclosure," and subject only to limited exceptions. After tracing the source
664, 695 n.174 (1967) (citing Address of David Ferber, Solicitor, SEC, Before New York Society of
Security Analysts, Feb. 17, 1966, p.6) (noting that SEC did not charge Texas Gulf Sulphur with violation
of 10b-5 in absence of trading or prior misstatement). In 1970, however, the SEC, in what has become its
principal statement on timely disclosure, emphasized the corporation's duty to make prompt and accurate
disclosure of material developments. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8995, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970). In this release, the SEC
implied that the duty exists in the absence of trading or prior inaccurate disclosures. See id. The SEC also
pointed out that this duty is distinct from the duty to comply with statutory reporting requirements and
that, although the two obligations may overlap, compliance with one duty will not necessarily satisfy the
other. Id. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 10569, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 79,607, at 83,629 (Dec. 20, 1973) (companies obliged to disclose impact of fuel
shortages on their operations); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 9650, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 78,852, at 81,865 '(June 22, 1972) (defense and other long term
contractors obliged to disclose engineering and technical problems and significant dollar amounts, as well
as progress towards completion).
8. The duty to disclose imposed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is set forth in its Company
Manual but not in its listing agreement. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § A2, at
A-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as COMPANY MANUAL]. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) includes
the duty to disclose in both the listing agreement and its Company Guide. See AMERICAN STOCK
EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE §§ 401-406 & app. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPANY GUIDE]; notes
211-25 infra and accompanying text.
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. also has a duty to disclose that applies to all
corporations whose securities are listed on NASDAQ. The sanction for violation of the duty is delisting.
NASD Bylaws, Art. XVI, § 3, Schedule D, part II B.3.b (1979).
9. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing the issue but not
deciding whether there is an affirmative duty to disclose under lob-5 in the absence of trading), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
10. See Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 96,737 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1979).
11. Neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act define "material," although both statutes use the term. See
1934 Act §§ 9, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(4), 78n(e); 1933 Act §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77(1)(2). The
rules under those acts, however, define material information as that "as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed" before entering into a securities transaction. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.405() (1978); id. § 240.12b-2(j) (1978).
The Supreme Court recently defined materiality in the context of a section 14(a) action. See TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (omitted fact material if "substantial likelihood that
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" when making voting decision) (emphasis added). The
same standard of materiality is applicable in lOb-5 actions. See Haravy v. Apparel Indus., 571 F.2d 737,
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of the duty and examining the problems of form, manner, and timing of
disclosure, the article addresses some special problems under rule lOb-5-the
duty to update, the duty to correct, and the duty to disclose financial
projections. Finally, the article examines alternative sources of liability for
failure to disclose. Although two other sources are available, the article
concludes that rule lOb-5 is the most appropriate vehicle for imposing
liability.
I. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE: AN OVERVIEW
The fraud element of a lOb-5 cause of action is satisfied by a finding of
deception. There are two theories why failure to disclose material information
constitutes deception in violation of rule 10b-5. Failure to disclose may
constitute a breach of the corporation's implied representation that it will
disclose material information. Alternatively, if a corporation permits previous
disclosures that are no longer accurate to remain uncorrected, it implicitly
741 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978).
Once the standard of materiality is defined, however, the concept of materiality will still vary with the
context in which it is to be determined; information may be defined as material for some purposes but not
for others. The SEC itself has recently stated that in determining materiality, "there is no litmus paper
test. . . . T]he consideration whether particular information should be disclosed necessarily depends on
the context in which the question arises." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS
AND PRACTICES 22 (May 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT]. Former SEC Chairman Ray Garrett,
Jr., has suggested that the disclosure requirements could vary depending on whether disclosure was in
connection with an investment or a voting decision. Ray Garrett, Jr., The Uses of Disclosure 6, 10
(National Investor Relations Institute, Sept. 30, 1975); see SEC REPORT, supra at 34 & n.24 (disclosure in
proxy statement of material facts regarding corporate officer's questionable payments may be required if
conduct relevant to quality of management, any prior disclosure occurred significantly earlier, and
management has not disclosed intent to stop practices); cf. Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,505, at 92,441 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (action for securities law violation against
candidates for director relevant to election and should have been disclosed in proxy statement).
Courts have also recognized that the context may alter the standard of materiality. See SEC v. Geon
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 1976) (potential merger material for purposes of imposing duty to
abstain from tipping, but not necessarily material for purposes of disclosure in SEC report); Spielman v.
General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (materiality in abstract is meaningless
concept), aff d, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (because formal legal document, 1933 Act prospectus should have
disclosed surplus even if only small number of potential traders would want to know). For a comprehensive
treatment of the concept of materiality, see Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32
Bus. LAW. 887 (1977).
For the purpose of applying the duty to disclose, the context in which materiality must be defined is that
of the trading market in which ongoing investment decisions are being made. In this context, information is
material and disclosure is required if the information would have a reasonably immediate impact upon the
reasonable investor's investment decision. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968) (en bane) (suggesting that information material if it affects desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold
company's securities), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); cf. Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate
Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289
(1965) (management's duty to disclose should be limited to extraordinary situations reasonably certain to
affect substantially market price of security). This standard is similar to the English concept of "price-
sensitive information." See Lipton, English Company Law Reform Proposals, 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 16, 27
(1974). See also ALI, FED. SEC. CODE § 257 (Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 15, 1978) (definition of "fact of
special significance"). Clearly, this determination will often be difficult; indeed, many duty-to-disclose
cases will turn on the materiality of the undisclosed fact. For the purposes of this article, materiality will be
assumed.
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
permits those disclosures to represent present conditions. Either of these
failures to disclose may be considered deceptive.
Because the situations giving rise to the duty are often so complex, a
corporation should have some discretion to determine the form, manner, and
timing of disclosure. Of these the last is the most complex. For example, it
would be unfair to penalize a corporation for what appears in hindsight to be
untimely disclosure if the corporation has made a reasonable effort to
disclose. 12 Additionally, a balance must often be struck between the legitimate
informational needs of investors and the equally legitimate need of the
corporation and its nontrading stockholders for silence. These competing
needs are particularly difficult to harmonize because, at any given time, the
corporation's nontrading stoclAolders far outnumber those investors who are
trading in the corporation's securities.
Were the duty to disclose rigidly interpreted, innocent nontrading
stockholders would ultimately bear either the business losses that the
corporation could suffer from premature disclosure or the burden of any
damages assessed against the corporation for breach of the duty. Although
stockholders always bear the ultimate loss whenever corporations pay
damages, the difficulty in deciding when to disclose adds to the potential
unfairness of imposing such losses on innocent stockholders and suggests a
need to limit the duty. Courts generally consider timing to be a question of
management's discretion and have hesitated to disturb the exercise of that
discretion. 13 Courts should examine closely the question of timing, however,
and give weight, but not complete deference, to the corporation's judgment.
Added judicial scrutiny will encourage corporations to consider the need for
disclosure without affording unreasonably wide latitude to corporate manage-
ment in deciding the timing of disclosure. Because the duty is designed to
encourage full and prompt disclosure rather than to penalize corporations for
failure to disclose, satisfaction of the duty should turn on a corporation's
disclosure procedures and whether the corporation has acted reasonably in
determining whether, when, and how to disclose.
One element of any action brought under rule lOb-5, which raises
particularly difficult questions in the context of timing, is scienter. Clearly,
when a corporation actually intends to deceive by failing to disclose, the
requisite scienter is present. It is more difficult, however, to determine when
intent to deceive should be inferred. If actual knowledge of the undisclosed
material fact establishes a constructive intent to deceive, scienter would exist
in almost every duty-to-disclose case because a corporation delaying disclo-
sure almost certainly is aware of both the materiality of the information and
the fact of nondisclosure. Consequently, a corporation could be found to have
violated rule lOb-5 even if it were acting reasonably in determining the timing
of disclosure. To avoid this result, scienter should not be inferred if a
corporation acts with due care and good faith with respect to its duty to
12. See notes 94-123 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir.) (en
bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850
n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (dictum), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
1979]
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disclose. Reckless conduct in connection with the duty to disclose, however,
should constitute scienter.14
In addition, there are some special problems that arise out of the duty to
disclose. In some situations, a corporation will have a duty to update its own
previously disclosed information that, although accurate when made, has
become materially misleading because of subsequent events. A corporation
has a duty to update previously disclosed information if an investor could
reasonably rely on the continuing accuracy of that information. Similarly,
although a corporation cannot be held responsible for the accuracy of all
publicly available information, it will be required to correct misstatements
made by corporate officials or by persons outside the corporation. Like the
duty to update, this obligation is not absolute; it will arise only when the
misstatement has been made either by an outsider who has a special
relationship with the corporation, or by a corporate officer whose position
creates an added expectation that the disclosure is reliable. Even then, a
corporation should not have a duty to correct if it has established procedures
to prevent such misstatements, and these procedures are breached through no
fault of the corporation.
Some words of caution are appropriate. The potential scope of this article is
almost as broad as the potential scope of the duty to disclose, and some limits
on both are necessary. The principal purpose of this article is to propose both
a normative duty to disclose and the standards required to comply with that
duty.15 The article raises, but does not purport to answer completely,
questions of who could enforce the duty to disclose and what remedies could
be obtained for its breach. It is clear that the SEC, through its existing
statutory powers, can enforce the duty and obtain injunctive relief if it can
establish a breach. 16 Similarly, injured investors could recover damages under
14. See notes 131-40 infra and accompanying text.
15. Hence, the article does not discuss the obligations of corporate management in connection with their
own securities transaction or with the liability arising from breach of these obligations.
16. In order to prevail in a rule lOb-5 action, the SEC must prove the following: (1) The defendant used
interstate commerce, the mails, or a national securites exchange in committing the alleged violation, see
1934 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, quoted at note 2 supra; (2) the defendant made a
misrepresentation or misleading omission, or committed some other deception or fraud, see 1934 Act §
10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); (3) the misleading or undisclosed information was material, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-
5; see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (information material if it has
substantial likelihood of affecting deliberations of reasonable investor); and (4) the prohibited act occurred
"in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security," 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5. Although the SEC must show some relationship between the prohibited act and the purchase or
sale of a security, it need not prove that the prohibited act caused any actual injury. See SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) ("in connection with" requirment met when
device causes reasonable investor, relying thereon, to purchase or sell security), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). It is unclear whether the SEC must prove that the defendant acted with scienter or whether a
showing of negligence is sufficient to impose liability. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194
n.12 (1976) (leaving open question whether scienter necessary element of injunctive action). Compare SEC
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y 1976) (proof of scienter required in lab-5
injunctive proceeding by SEC), affd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) with SEC v. Aaron, [1979]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,128-32 & n.10 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 1979) (proof of scienter not
required in lOb-5 injunctive actions by the SEC). Cf. SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1005-
07 (4th Cir. 1978) (proof of scienter not required in injunctive action by the SEC under § 17a of 1933 act);
SEC v Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976) (proof of negligence only required
in SEC injunctive proceeding under § 5 of the 1933 Act), cert.
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rule lOb-5 if they could satisfy the elements of a private cause of action.17 It is
also clear that, to the extent a similar duty exists under the stock exchange
rules, the exchanges could enforce that duty in a delisting proceeding.'8
Alternatively, an investor could seek to develop an implied right of action for
breach of the stock exchanges' existing duty to disclose. Such liability,
premised on either a theory that a breach of the exchanges' duty to disclose
consitutes a breach of a rule adopted pursuant to the federal securities laws or
on the theory that investors are third-party beneficiaries under state common
law contract principles, would be difficult to establish.
Finally, it must be recognized that this article espouses the creation of a
duty under rule lOb-5 at a time when the Supreme Court has been giving the
federal securities law an increasingly narrow interpretation.19 Nonetheless,
denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (Ist Cir. 1976) (dictum)
(proof of scienter not required in 10b-5 injunctive action; injunction to protect public not to punish state of
mind). Most recently, courts have declined to decide this issue, either by inferring scienter from the
defendant's conduct or by finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged scienter. See SEC v. Wills, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) q 96,102, at 91,972-73 (D.D.C. 1977) (SEC complaint
alleging defendant used devices and schemes to defraud sufficiently alleges scienter); SEC v. American Beef
Packers, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) % 96,079, at 91,876 (D. Neb. 1977)
(scienter found in § 14(a)(9) action; president signed proxy statement and annual report with knowledge
that certain credit transactions had been omitted from it). See generally 90 HARV. L. REv. 1018 (1977)
(comparing Bausch & Lomb with World Radio Mission; suggesting that if focus of inquiry is future
undesirable conduct, scienter will be found if court concludes that future conduct likely).
17. The courts have long recognized a private cause of action for breach of rule lOb-5. See Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.) (private claim withstood motion to dismiss),
modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Like the SEC, a private plaintiff must show the
use ofjurisdictional means and the commission of a prohibited act. See the 1934 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 780);
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5, quoted at note 2 supra. In addition, the private plaintiff must show the following: (1)
Standing to sue because he purchased or sold the corporation's securities, and was not merely a potential
investor, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975); (2) the defendant acted
with scienter, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (recklessness held to constitute scienter when alleged aider and abettor
owed fiduciary duty to defrauded party), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 642 (1978); and (3) the prohibited act
occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security," 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
The "in connection with" requirement is stricter in a private cause of action than in an SEC action. The
private plaintiff must prove actual injury. See 1934 Act § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (limiting recovery to
actual damages). The private plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's act caused his loss. Titan
Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975). In the case of misrepresentation, the plaintiff must
have relied on the defendant's misleading statement. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90,
102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In the case of an omission, however, the obligation to
disclose and the withholding of a material fact constitute causation as a matter of law, even in an open
securities market where there is no privity of contract. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 154 (1972); cf. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976) (no causation when
defendant insider's trading did not affect stock price and defendant did not otherwise influence plaintiff to
sell), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
For a general discussion of the elements of a lOb-5 cause of action, see 2 A. BROMBERG supra note 4, §§
8.2, 8.3, 8.5, 8.7-.9, 10.1; 5-5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 5., pt. 2-9.
18. See notes 226-95 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1977) (fraud under lOb-5 requires
deception or manipulation designed to mislead investors); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42
(1977) (defeated tender offeror has no standing to sue for damages under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act); TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (fact material if substantial likelihood that
reasonable shareholder would consider it in deciding how to vote); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 (1976) (civil action for damages under lob-5 requires more than negligence); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (plaintiff in private action under rule lOb-5 must be
purchaser or seller of security). See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
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this article argues that the duty to disclose, although not expressly mandated
by rule lOb-5, is consistent with the language of the rule, the legislative
history of the 1934 Act, and the policies underlying both the Act and the
rule.20 The duty would provide investors with additional information about
corporations and would enhance investor trust and confidence in the
securities markets. 21 Moreover, it is a needed supplement to the existing
mandatory disclosure system of the 1934 Act,22 a system that often results in
investors either not obtaining certain information at all or obtaining it when it
is less useful in making an investment decision. 23 Furthermore, however
narrow the Court's recent interpretations of rule lOb-5, the Court has
continued to recognize that the basic purpose of the federal securities laws is
to protect investors in their securities transactions. 24 It is this end that the
duty to disclose is designed to further.
20. The decision with the most bearing on the duty to disclose is Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977), which defined "deceptive" and "manipulative" for purposes of section 10(b). In that case, the
plaintiffs, minority shareholders in a 95%-owned subsidiary of Santa Fe Industries, alleged that the merger
of Santa Fe and the subsidiary, though valid under the Delaware short-form merger statute, violated
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 467-68. The asserted bases of the violation were the lack of notice of the
merger, the absence of a valid business purpose for the merger, and the unfair price offered the minority
shareholders. Id. The Court held that the merger was neither "deceptive" nor "manipulative" because
there was no misrepresentation, omission, or any artificial effect on market activity designed to mislead
investors. Id. at 471-72.
This article agrees that either deception or manipulation is necessary to state a cause of action under
section 10(b). The duty to disclose simply expands the concept of a misrepresentation or omission
necessary to a finding of deception.
21. See, ag., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (goal of
securities laws to give all investors trading on impersonal exchanges relatively equal access to material
information), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 4 A. BROMBERG; supra note 4, §§ 12.2-.6, at 269-77 (listing
purposes of lOb-5); Feuerstein, supra note 5 , at 403 (success of economic system depends on investor
confidence, which in turn depends on ease with which investors can ascertain pertinent facts regarding
investments).
22. See 1934 Act, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11, 240.13a-13; Forms
10-K, 8-K, 10-Q. Current reports must be filed upon the occurrence of any of the following events: change
in the control of the registrant, acquisition or disposition of a significant amount of assets, institution of
material legal proceedings, change in the registrant's certifying accountant, bankruptcy or receivership, or
resignations of registrant's directors. Form 8-K, Items 1-6.
23. See Form 8-K, General Instruction B(current report to be filed within 15 days of occurrence of
specified event); Form 10-Q, § A(b) (quarterly report to be filed within 45 days after end of each of first
three quarters of each fiscal year); Form 10-K, General Instruction A(b) (annual report to be filed within
90 days after end of fiscal year).
24. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (in 1934 Act, Congress intended to
prohibit full range of manipulative devices; manipulation does not include majority shareholder's breach of
fiduciary duty to minority); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (section 14(e) of 1934
Act enacted to protect shareholders of target corporations, not tender offerors); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976) (section 14(a) of 1934 Act intended to ensure disclosure by
corporate management in order to enable shareholders to make informed choice in voting); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01 (1976) (in order to accomplish remedial goals of securities laws,
Congress did not uniformly accept negligence standard; language of§ 10(b) requires showing of intentional
misconduct); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728, 731-34 (1975) (1933 and 1934
Acts enacted to prevent fraud in securities market, but Congress intended to limit civil remedy under §
10(b) to actual purchasers or sellers).
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II. SOURCE OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
The source of the duty to disclose under the federal securities laws is rule
lOb-5. 25 Although the language of the rule does not impose this duty, the duty
is consistent with the legislative history and underlying policies of both the
1934 Act and rule lOb-5. 26
In order to establish a violation of rule lOb-5 a plaintiff must prove the
existence of fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. '27
The Supreme Court has held that only transactions involving either manipu-
lation or deception constitute fraud under the rule.28 The failure to disclose
information under the duty to disclose, however, meets both of the tests.
Under existing law the "in connection with" requirement of rule lOb-5 is
satisfied if the corporation either purchases or sells its own securities 29 or
issues a materially false or misleading statement. In the latter case, the
misstatement affects the market for the corporation's stock by making
inaccurate the information on which investors trade.30 As a result, the
misstatement issued by the corporation causes the harm investors suffer if
they trade on the basis of the misinformation. 31 If the corporation breaches its
duty to disclose, the "in connection with" requirement will be satisfied
25. See note 2 supra (text of rule lOb-5).
26. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (purpose of 1934 Act" 'to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor' '; cf. Superintendent of Ins. of New York
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (section 10(b) meant to bar deceptive devices in purchase
or sale of securities); note 21 supra.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the appropriate method of interpreting the federal securities laws
is to examine the language of the statute first. Eg., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Then, if the language is not clear, the legislative history
should be consulted. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 473; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. at 201; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring). Only if
neither the language nor the legislative history is dispositive should the underlying statutory policies be
considered. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 476-77, 478; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. at 214 n.33. Some members of the Court have commented that given the inherent breadth of § 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, policy considerations should always be reviewed. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. at 737 (Rehnquist, J., writing for plurality).
27. See note 2 supra (text of rule lOb-5).
28. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,473-74 & n.15 (1977) (Court refused to find violation of
l0b-5; conduct alleged did not constitute deception or manipulation).
29. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (dictum) (duty to disclose material
facts when corporation purchasing its own securities from minority stockholder; no liability because
reasonable disclosure made).
30. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968) ("in connection with" requirement met when
debentures and stocks bought after materially false, misleading, and untrue financial statements issued),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane) (10b-5 violated when false, misleading, or incomplete assertions made in manner reasonably
calculated to influence investors), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
31. The plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities in order to have standing to sue. Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 749 (1975). In a derivative suit the plaintiff stockholder
need not have purchased or sold securities if the corporation, on whose behalf he is bringing suit, has
bought or sold its own securities. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209,221 (2d Cir. 1977) (stockholder's
complaint stated a cause of action in derivative suit under lOb-5 against parent corporation that received
subsidiary's stock in exchange for its assets), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); cf Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 738 (shareholders who have not bought or sold securities may be able to
bring derivative suit on behalf of corporate issuer if issuer is purchaser or seller of securities).
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because nondisclosure, like the issuance of a false or misleading statement,
causes harm to investors who make-decisions on the basis of inaccurate or
incomplete information.32
Similarly, a court could find that a corporation's failure to disclose
constitutes deception, necessary for a finding of fraud under the rule.
Disseminated information that has become materially misleading will be left
in the market if a corporation fails to disclose. 33 This theory is premised on the
assumption that investors rely on the accuracy of previously disclosed
information. Failure to disclose new information would be viewed as a
decision by the corporation to permit previous disclosures to represent
present conditions. If the corporation knows that that information no longer
is accurate, it would constitute deception under rule lOb-5.
Alternatively, deception could be found by applying to corporations the
duties expressed in the "shingle theory" and the "trust and confidence
doctrine" presently applicable only to broker-dealers. 34 These theories of
liability emphasize the complexity of securities and the sophistication usually
possessed by broker-dealers. 35 Under the shingle theory the broker, by doing
business with the public, is held to an implied representation that "he will deal
fairly with his customers in accordance with the standards of his profes-
sion."' 36 Cases based on this theory stress that the broker's obligation exists
even in the absence of any special dependence or reliance by the customer on
32. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (investors injured
by deceptive statements), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). "The market will be affected by nondisclosure
of facts just as it will be affected by material representations. The eventual result of such blurring in the
context of the 'in connection with' requirement points toward liability for failure to make disclosure, even
in the absence of trading." Ruder, Guidelines to Solution of the Corporate Disclosure Dilemma, in
EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITIEs LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY 83, 96 (V.D. Nordin ed. 1969).
Recently one court suggested in dicta that there might be no duty to disclose absent trading. See
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) (duty to disclose not absolute; insider who abstains
from trading has right to keep information secret), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). In Fridrich, however,
the only issue was whether the particular plaintiffs bringing the action could recover damages in excess of
those placed in escrow pursuant to an earlier SEC enforcement action for an undisputed violation of rule
lOb-5. Id. at 309, 311, 314. In light of this, Fridrich should be limited to its facts and not interpreted to
define a corporation's duty to disclose. Compare id. with Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (causation necessary to justify damages when defendant under duty either to
abstain from trading or disclose information, and plaintiff had no knowledge of defendant's actions;
causation in fact existed because of trading).
33. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Financial Reporting in a Troubled Industry, National
Assoc. of Real Estate Investment Trusts' Annual Accounting and Tax Conference 8 (June 5, 1975).
34. Cf. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 10.1 (rule lob-5 "on the way to creating a 'shingle' rule of fair
trading for insiders").
35. Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative
Adjudication in their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 691, 702 (1964).
36. Id. at 702-03; see Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (dealer
cannot charge prices not reasonably related to prevailing market price without disclosing that fact), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388 (1939) (customer should be dealt with
fairly, in accordance with standards of profession).
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the broker.37 The trust and confidence doctrine is somewhat narrower,38 but is
closely related to the shingle theory. This theory of liability is based on the
premise that a special relationship of trust and confidence exists between the
broker-dealer and his customer.39 Because of that relationship, the broker-
dealer must disclose to his client the extent and nature of any interest he may
have in the transactions he conducts for the client and must act in the client's
best interests.40
If these theories are applied to a corporation, it would be held to have
incurred a duty to investors under the shingle theory by creating a public
market in its securities. In addition, by cultivating investor trust and
confidence through its public statements and financial reports and by
encouraging investor reliance on these documents, the corporation makes an
implicit representation: it will deal fairly with and do nothing to deceive
investors41 and it will make full disclosure to them of all material information,
whether or not it has traded or previously spoken. The failure to disclose,
unless otherwise justified, 42 would thus constitute a breach of the corpora-
tion's implied representation and would constitute "deception" of investors in
violation of rule lOb-5.
37. Cohen & Rabin, supra note 35, at 704; see In re Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566, 570
(1963) (salesman who gives opinion on market impliedly represents he has adequate basis for it); In re Heft,
Kahn & Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379, 383 (1963) (implied representation that customer will be dealt with
honestly and fairly inherent in dealer-customer relationship); In re Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116, 118
(1962) (basic to relationship between broker-dealer and his customers is representation customers will be
dealt with fairly in accordance with standards of profession).
Mac Robbins & Co. is an excellent example of the application of the shingle theory. The registrant was a
"boiler-room" brokerage firm, in which salesmen would call unknown individuals and make high pressure
sales pitches for highly speculative investments. In re Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. at 119-20.
Commissioner Cohen noted in the case that "the making of representations. . . without a reasonable basis
. . .and designed to induce purchases, is contrary to the basic obligation of fair dealing borne by those who
engage in the sale of securities to the public." Id. at 119 (footnote omitted).
38. See Cohen & Rabin, supra note 35, at 702.
39. Id. at 703; see In re Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 634, 637 (1948) (furnishing investment
counsel on fee basis cultivates confidential relationship imposing duty to act in best interests of clients and
to disclose fully all material information).
40. Id.
41. The American Stock Exchange has accepted the idea that a corporation has a duty of fair dealing:
"A company which lists its shares on the Exchange in effect invites the public to invest in these securities."
COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 401; cf. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369,
373-75 (D. Del. 1965) (shareholder who agrees, in the event of merger, to sell his shares to surviving
corporation relies upon honesty and fair dealing of that corporation).
The theory of an implied representation of fair dealing could be extended to the entire area of corporate
management. See Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 254,296-
97 (1972). See also Address by Harvey L. Pitt, General Counsel, SEC, Practicing Law Institute,
Materiality-Search for Elusive Truth 13 (June 24, 1976).
In addition, one court has noted in another context that:
[T]o the American investing public listing on the New York Stock Exchange carries with it
implicit guarantees of trustworthiness. The public generally understands that a company
must meet certain qualifications of financial stability, prestige, and fair disclosure, in order to
be accepted for that listing, which is in turn so helpful to the sale of the company's securities.
Similarly it is held out to the investing public that while dealing in securities listed on the New
York Stock Exchange the investor will be dealt with fairly and pursuant to the law.
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. See notes 113-23 & 191-210 infra and accompanying text for discussion of reasos justifying delay of
disclosure or, in the case of projections, permanent nondisclosure.
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Just as a broker incurs a duty to disclose because he has expressly or
implicitly solicited a customer to enter into a transaction, a corporation incurs
a similar duty when it solicits new investors. The pages of various publica-
tions, for example, often contain corporate advertisements soliciting inquiries
from potential investors.43 Additionally, a corporation depends upon its
stockholders and investors as a source of financing and support for manage-
ment's policies. This dependence is based in part on disclosure; the failure to
disclose may thus cause stockholders to be reluctant to continue their support
of the corporation. 44
The recent Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,45
which appears to cut back on the use of rule 1Ob-5 in cases involving a duty of
fair dealing, does not undermine the use of the shingle theory and trust and
confidence doctrine as rationales for the duty to disclose. Santa Fe involved
the question whether traditional fiduciary duties, cognizable at state law,
could be read into rule lOb-5. 46 The Court held that allegations of mere
unfairness, in the absence of manipulation or deception, did not constitute a
violation of rule lOb-5. 47 The Court recognized, however, that when some
element of deception, including nondisclosure, is involved, "section 10(b)
must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. '48 The duty to disclose
is premised not on fiduciary duty or fairness, although there are elements of
these present, but on the prevention of deception. 49 Therefore, neither the
holding nor the implications of Santa Fe precludes establishing the duty or
using the shingle theory and trust and confidence doctrine as rationales.
The legislative history of the 1934 Act reveals that Congress did not
directly address the question of prompt disclosure. The history strongly
suggests, however, that Congress intended investors to have all the informa-
tion necessary for investment decisionmaking. 50 Although Congress believed
43. See TIME, Feb. 5, 1979, at 45-109 (including copy of 1978 Annual Report of Gulf & Western, Inc.,
and requesting inquiries for extra copies).
44. See Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 16, col. 3 (management should provide better information to
investors to achieve higher share price); Bus. WEEK, Jan. 22, 1979, at 47 (public relations campaign may
strengthen corporation's position).
45. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
46. Id. at 478, 479 (without clear Congressional intent to the contrary court should be reluctant to
federalize substantial portion of state corporate securities laws if established state policies would be
overridden). Similarly, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court refused to imply a private cause of
action for damages against corporate directors in favor of a stockholder under a criminal statute regulating
corporate contributions to federal presidential election funds. The Court noted that the internal affairs of a
corporation should be regulated by state law "except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders ...... Id. at 84. The Court relied in part on the
fact that Congress passed the legislation at issue to dull corporate impact on federal elections, and not to
regulate corporations as such. Id. at 85. Implying a private cause of action "would not aid the primary
Congressional goal. . . and cure the influence which the use of corporate funds in the first instance may
have had on a federal election." Id. at 84.
47. 430 U.S. at 474.
48. Id. at 475 & n.15.
49. Cf. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1977) (Friendly, J.) (Santa Fe does not
preclude 10b-5 action, and deception of the corporation is present when controlling shareholders influence
corporation to engage in transaction adverse to its interests and there is nondisclosure or misleading
disclosure about material facts of the transaction), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). There may be
elements of fairness, fiduciary duty, and deception in lOb-5 nondisclosure cases. See id.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
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that the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act were adequate to begin to
provide such information, it gave the SEC rulemaking authority to require
additional reporting if necessary. 51 Because there is usually a substantial time
lag between the occurrence of an event'and its disclosure in a statutory filing52
and because there is no requirement that the corporation disseminate its
statutory filings, 53 the duty to disclose would provide a necessary supplement
to statutory filings and would be consistent with the original congressional
intent.
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) (reporting requirements
are modest beginning to aid investor in obtaining information); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) (reporting requirements are minimum necessary to protect investors). The
House Report on the House version of what are now the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act stated
that "no investor. . . can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelligent
basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. . . . [The hiding and
secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value." H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) (Commission may
require additional information from corporation for protection of investors); 78 CONG. REC. 7698 (1934)
(drafter of House version of 1934 Act thought reporting requirements "minimal"); see 1934 Act § 13, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1976).
This legislative history suggests that the SEC has the authority to adopt a prompt disclosure rule
pursuant to section 13 rather than section 10(b). Nevertheless, it is consistent to utilize rule lOb-5 in the
absence of a rule under section 13; a duty under either section can be inferred from the congressional intent.
Indeed, rule 1Ob-5, although originally designed to prevent fraudulent schemes, now compels disclosure to
prevent deception. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 12.3, at 275 (although lOb-5 originally developed
to combat devious schemes, it now serves to compel disclosure).
52. Generally, Form 8-K must be filed within 15 days after the occurrence of the earliest event required
to be reported. Form 8-K General Instruction B. This timing requirement is generally shorter than that
which had existed for many years prior to the recent amendment of Form 8-K. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Release No. 13156, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,228, at 62,558 (Jan. 13, 1977) (amendments
adopted to provide more timely filing of reports on Form 8-K). Form 10-Q is to be filed within 45 days
after the end of each of the first three fiscal quarters of each fiscal year; filing of Form 10-K is generally
required within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year. Form 10-Q, § A(b) Form 10-K, General Instruction
A(b).
It is generally acknowledged by both critics and defenders of the existing statutory disclosure system
that information contained in statutory filings is of less immediate use to investors because of these delays.
See SEC STAFF REPORT, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTs, ch. X, at 36, 37, 39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT]; Benston,
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, 5 (May 1974); Cohen, Truth in
Securities Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1373 (1966). See also R. Kaplan, The Information Content of
Financial Accounting Numbers: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, (Sept. 1975) (for presentation at
Symposium on the Impact of Research in Financial Accounting Practice, Dec. 4-5, 1975) (copy on file at
the Georgetown Law Journal) (studies indicate generally significant price and volume changes occur when
interim reports are released by corporations).
The application of economic theory to the duty to disclose has not been discussed in this article, but is
worthy of further study. Among other issues, such a study could consider the efficient market hypothesis
and its implications for the development of future securities regulation. See generally J. LORIE & M.
HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET-THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (1973); Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful
Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293 (1975) (citing sources); Note, The Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977);
R. Kaplan, supra.
53. The only report that a corporation must publicly disseminate is an annual report to security holders,
which is not filed with the SEC. See 1934 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14c-1,-101
(1978).
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Finally, the duty to disclose is consistent with the policies underlying the
1934 Act and rule lOb-5 54 because the additional disclosure may enhance
investor confidence in the securities markets, which is arguably the principal
purpose of all the securities laws.55 Individual investors are less likely to have
confidence in the market and to invest if they believe that corporations are
withholding material information.56 Indeed, investors now expect more from
corporations and corporate insiders than simply restraint from deceit and
fraud;57 they expect full and prompt disclosure of material information. 58
They have come to rely, "consciously or unconsciously, on the completeness
and adequacy of the information about the issuer afloat in the market." 59 To
the extent that this reliance may not be shared, they believe, correctly or not,
that those who do have this information will benefit from it to the detriment
of those investors who do not.60
III. DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Compliance with the duty to disclose involves more than mere preparation
and distribution of a press release to the media.61 The corporation must
disclose the information in a form that is designed to reduce the possibility of
omission or distortion of material facts upon publication. It must also attempt
to disseminate the information in a manner calculated to convey its substance
adequately to all interested investors. And, unless valid business reasons
warrant delay, the corporation must disclose the information promptly after
collection and evaluation of the relevant facts.
54. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 5, § 88.04[a], at 4-3 (listing policies behind lOb-5).
55. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market
Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 816 (1973); Fleischer, supra note 11, at 1274; cf. Address by Ray
Garrett, Jr., Chairman SEC, An Inside Look at Rule lOb-5, American Law Institute/ American Bar
Association, Washington, D.C. (April 10, 1975).
56. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8995, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) % 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970) (prompt disclosure of material corporate developments
necessary to maintain investor confidence); cf. Schotland, Institutional Disclosure: The Forgotten Stepchild
of the Disclosure Family, 66 GEo. L.J. 1257,1259-63 (1978) (disclosure of institutional holdings increases
public confidence in markets).
57. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 1279; Leavell, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Opinion: An Open Door to
Federal Control of Corporations, 3 GA. L. REV. 141, 158 (1965); Lipton, Liability of Buyers and Sellers in
Market Transactions4in THE 10B-5 SERIES OF RULES 75, 85 (K. Bialkin, Chairman 1974); cf. 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 5, § 88.04[a].
58. Because there is little empirical data about what investors actually expect, this conclusion is open to
debate. Absent a clear duty to disclose, investors only expect that they will have equal access to material
information. See Talesnick, supra note 5, at 383-85.
59. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 7.1.
60. "People won't play poker when they think the cards are marked and one of the players knows the
code." Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Another Look at Insider Trading, Southwest-
ern Legal Foundation Symposium on Securities Regulation, in Dallas, Texas (April 4, 1975). See
Georgeson & Co. and Lind Brothers, Inc., The Reluctant Marriage 3, 4 (Jan. 1, 1978) (survey ofindividual
investors reveals general belief that corporations fail to communicate sufficiently with them and favor
institutional investors).
61. "iThe reading ofa news release. . . is merely the first step in the process of dissemination required
for compliance with the regulatory objective of providing all investors with an equal opportunity to make
informed investment judgments." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also COMPANY MANUAL supra note 8, at A-23, A-24.
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The uncertainties inherent in each of these requirements make it difficult to
establish firm rules for a corporation to follow. For example, complex
information cannot always be easily summarized; the corporation cannot
always control the dissemination of the information; and the time at which
disclosure is required will vary depending upon the corporation's need for
silence and investors' need for the information. It is possible, however, to
establish guidelines within which a corporation should act that can be used by
a court to decide whether, in view of the totality of the circumstances, a
corporation has made a good faith effort to comply with its duty to disclose.
FORM OF DISCLOSURE
The corporation must prepare its press release to convey fully and
accurately the information to investors. Even then, full disclosure can be
accomplished only if the information is published accurately. Although there
will always be some risk that the media will omit or distort material facts, a
corporation should be required to disclose facts in a form calculated to reduce
that risk.62 When the material facts are reasonably simple, a corporation can
issue a short release setting out the facts in a form that will require little or no
alteration by the media.63 The problem is substantially more difficult,
however, when the information is complex, highly technical, or not suscepti-
ble to easy summary by the media. In such a case the corporation has two
choices, each of which raises other problems. It may prepare its own
summary of the facts in a release that can be easily used by the media. If that
summary is materially misleading, however, the corporation will be held
liable for issuing a false and misleading press release.64 Alternatively, it may
issue a full and accurate release, however lengthy and complex; although the
corporation knows that the media will not usually publish such a release in its
entirety,65 it can argue that the disclosure obligation is satisfied and that any
omissions are the fault of the media. This argument, however, fails to
recognize that investors are likely to assume that the published information
accurately reflects what the corporation believes to be all the material facts. 66
62. In other contexts courts have suggested that disclosure, although complete, may be materially
misleading if it is placed in the disclosure document in such a manner that its significance to investors is
obscured. Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 774 (3d Cir. 1976) (proxy materials
held materially deficient when conflict of interest information scattered and buried in lengthy proxy
statement); Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1968) (proxy statement held
misleading because directors failed to emphasize possible conflict of interest while strongly recommending
merger), vacated and rem. on other groundsi 396 U.S. 375 (1970); see Richland v. Crandell, 262 F. Supp.
538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (material information about directors' conflict of interest not clearly stated, not
emphasized as was other information in prospectus, and not positioned so as to be noticeable).
63. See COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 404 (keep release simple and avoid irrelevant facts and overly
technical jargon).
64. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) (duty to disclose facts to make statements not misleading),
quoted at note 2 supra.
65. Corporations should be aware that the media will not always publish a corporate release in its
entirety. See Haft, Corporate "News" Dissemination-An Introduction, in CORPORATE NEws DISSEMINA-
TION, supra note 5, at 9, 21, 24. Many corporations either retain financial public relations firms that
specialize in preparing press releases for publication, or utilize their own internal personnel for these
purposes. See id. at 24.
66. In establishing a basis for regulation, the premise that investors believe that the media accurately
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Accordingly, a corporation should be required to issue complex information
in a form and manner calculated to meet the needs of investors and to reduce
the likelihood that material facts will be omitted from the published story.
The corporation can accomplish this by placing the most important facts at
the beginning of the release, timing the release to allow media representatives
sufficient time to familiarize themselves with and to make inquiries about the
release, and making corporate personnel available to answer questions. 67
Nevertheless, there will be situations in which the corporation will not be
able to comply with these requirements. For example, the SEC staff exerts
informal pressure on oil and gas exploration companies to use highly
technical terms in their releases and discourages the use of lay terminology on
the ground that such terminology will mislead investors. 68 Under these
circumstances, although use of technical terms makes it difficult for anyone
other than an expert in the industry to understand the information, the
corporation should be held to have satisfied its duty with respect to the form
of disclosure if it accedes to the SEC staff's position.
Once the corporation has taken appropriate steps to prepare and to issue a
press release, questions remain regarding its duty to correct inaccurately
published information and its liability if the media distort material facts.
When assessing the corporation's duty to correct and to update information, a
distinction must be drawn between errors and omissions in news articles and
misinformation conveyed in so-called interpretative articles. A corporation
that issues a press release expects that the media will publish a news article
based on that release and that investors will rely on the information in that
article. Investor reliance on interpretative articles, on the other hand, results
from the reputation of either the publication or the author.
The case law provides little guidance in delineating the scope of the duty.
In the Texas Gulf Sulfur litigation,69 the corporation (TGS) argued in the
lower court that its liability should be based on the accuracy of its entire press
release rather than on what actually was published by the media.70 Because
the court found that the release itself was materially false and misleading, it
did not pass directly on the merits of that argument.71 The court did suggest,
however, that TGS might have been liable had the media materially distorted
report a corporation's statements must be accepted. This proposition is undercut, though, to the extent that
readers are skeptical of what they read in the press.
67. The author has participated in conferences at which representatives of the press advise corporations
about the need for these and other similar procedures. See generally CORPORATE NEws DISSEMINATION,
supra note 5, at 385 (listing representatives of news media attending conference; no transcript of conference
available).
68. The author has written a press release for an oil and gas exploration company announcing the
discovery of a gas well. That release provided both technical data understandable by experts in the industry
and nontechnical information explaining the significance of the discovery to the average investor. The SEC
staff member to whom the release was read prior to its dissemination advised the author that the
nontechnical information was necessarily oversimplified and that he would recommended that the SEC
institute enforcement proceedings if it were not deleted. Despite the need to inform the average investor,
discretion proved to be the better part of valor.
69. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), judgment affd and order rev'd,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), order amended, 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
70. Id. at 86.
71. Id. at 86-87.
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an accurate release.72 In Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,73 however, although the court
refused to hold the corporation liable for several newspapers' erroneous
reports of the terms of a transaction, it did so on the ground that there was no
allegation that the corporation was responsible for, or knew of those reports. 74
More recently in Zucker v. Sable,75 although the corporation's release was
accurate, several major publications omitted an allegedly material word from
the published story.76 When the mistake was brought to the attention of the
corporation it corrected the error.77 Nevertheless, the court held that the
corporation had no legal duty to make such a correction because it would be
unreasonable to require a corporation to search out and correct errors
resulting from editing. The court stated that "[tlo require the defendants to
examine every financial publication to ascertain whether the reports of its
admittedly accurate press release have misinterpreted the information so as to
mislead members of the public would place them under an insurmountable
burden not required by the law."78
This language is overbroad. A corporation should not have to search out
"every financial publication." As the source of the information, however, the
corporation is best able to determine the accuracy of a published news story.
Because of the potential harm to investors from material omissions or
inaccuracies, the corporation should have a duty to review the information in
certain publications and request a correction if published information derived
from a corporation's press release is materially misleading.79 This duty should
be limited, however, to a review of those publications on which the
corporation reasonably believes investors are most likely to rely,80 and to
situations in which the corporation reasonably believes a substantial number
of investors will be misled by the misstatement.81 The duty should also be
72. See id. at 86 (TGS could not expect media to publish entire release; if important to present entire
release, TGS should have mailed copy to each shareholder).
73. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
74. Id. at 767. This finding was made possible because after the erroneous press release the corporation
had individually notified the plaintiffs of the correct terms of the transaction. Id. On this basis the court
found that any reliance by the plaintiffs on the newspaper articles would have been misplaced. Id.
75. 426 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
76. Id. at 662-63.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion the court erroneously relied on Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). There, misstatements had
appeared in the press for which the corporation was held not liable because they were not attributable to
the corporation. Id. at 949; see notes 160-90 infra and accompanying text.
79. The Wall Street Journal, for example, publishes a regular column entitled "Corrections and
Amplifications," which identifies and corrects erroneous information that has been previously published.
The author has been advised by a representative of the Wall Street Journal that it will include information
in this column upon request.
80. Both the New York and American Stock Exchanges recommend disclosure to major news services
and financial publications. See COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 403 (2), at 106-08; COMPANY MANUAL,
supra note 8, at A-23, A-24. Each corporation's obligation, however, should depend on the nature of the
market for its securities and the location of substantial numbers of its stockholders. See note 88 infra and
accompanying text.
81. Even this limited duty'can be difficult to apply. For example, suppose a medium-size corporation
located in Houston, Texas issues a short press release containing material information. The corporation
believes that most investors are likely to read and rely on information published on the Dow Jones Wire
Service and in the Wall Street Journal. In addition, however, there are many investors who will read and
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limited to a period of time within which such information is usually
published.82 The corporation should not be burdened with the duty to
continually search for inaccuracies in news stories.
By contrast, the corporation should have no duty to correct distortions or
inaccuracies that appear in interpretative articles. The corporation has not
directly induced or encouraged investor reliance, and unless the corporation
has spoken to the author of the article concerning the facts, it should not have
a duty to seek a correction; nor should it be liable for the author's
misstatements.8 3
MANNER OF DISCLOSURE: ADEQUATE DISSEMINATION
Even if a release is disclosed in an appropriate form, it may not be
published. The major financial wire services and newspapers have criteria for
inclusion of information based on the size of the corporation and the
significance of the information. 84 As a result, publication of information will
often be precluded. Even if the criteria are met and the information is
published, a corporation cannot guarantee that such publication will reach a
substantial number of investors. Nevertheless, a corporation should have an
obligation to make a good faith attempt to disseminate the information
adequately. Dissemination will be adequate only if it is directed to the
relevant securities markets in general rather than to a limited group of
investors. In one case, the SEC held that the release of material information
over a private wire service to a limited number of institutional subscribers
does not constitute adequate dissemination of that information. 85 Similarly,
rely on the Houston Chronicle and the New York Times. Suppose the release is sent to all four news services,
but only the Houston Chronicle publishes the release accurately and fully, while the Dow Jones Wire
Service and the Wall Street Journal omit a material fact, and the New York Times fails to publish the story
altogether. The corporation should have a duty to correct in this situation because a substantial number of
investors to whom the information has been erroneously released by the Dow Jones Service and the Wall
Street Journal may be harmed. On the other hand, if in the same situation all four news services published
the story and only the New York Times omitted a material fact, the corporation would have no duty to
correct. In this latter situation, the information has been reported accurately by the news services on which
most investors are likely to rely.
82. Limiting the duration of the corporation's duty to alert itself to inaccuracies in press releases is
supported by the analogous duty imposed on corporate insiders to abstain from trading in their
corporation's securities until material information is adequately disseminated. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (wait until news could reasonably be expected to
appear over media of widest circulation), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1969).
83. See notes 160-90 infra and accompanying text.
84. For example, the Wall Street Journal generally publishes a corporation's releases only if the
corporation's stock is quoted in the Journal. Even then, it publishes a release concerning a contract only if
the contract involves a transaction of at least $3,000,000. Conversation with Mr. Fred Taylor, Executive
Editor of the Wall Street Journal (March 26, 1979).
These criteria are, of course, subject to change as economic conditions and the editorial philosophy of
the newspapers change, but they illustrate the difficulty that many corporations face in getting their
releases disseminated.
85. In re Faberge, Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 10174, [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,378, at 83,101 (May 25, 1973). There the SEC agreed to a consent decree
acknowledging the "misuse of material non-public information" by corporate officers and other insiders.
Id. at 83,104-05. The SECstated:
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in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.86 the Second Circuit found that publication
of information in a Canadian newspaper of limited circulation was not
sufficient public dissemination.8 7 Both situations involved the question wheth-
er there had been sufficient dissemination to permit insider trading, but the
principle applies equally to the duty of a corporation in the absence of trading.
The purpose of the duty to disclose is to inform investors generally, and
limited dissemination does not achieve that purpose.
The extent of the obligation to disseminate will vary with the nature of the
principal market for the corporation's securities. If that market is na-
tional-as would be true for large corporations whose securities are either
listed on an exchange or traded in the over-the-counter market-the informa-
tion should be directed to the national financial press, the major financial
communities, and to any other areas in which the corporation knows there is
unusual interest in its securities. If the market is largely regional, dissemina-
tion should be made to the relevant regional financial communities and where
appropriate to the exchange community. Finally, if the market is essentially
local, dissemination may be limited to those places where there is a
demonstrable interest in the corporation's securities.88
Because of the difficulties in obtaining adequate dissemination, the proce-
dures a corporation follows should bear heavily on a determination of
whether it has satisfied its obligation. These procedures might include a press
release to the major financial wire services and the distribution of that release
to trade publications and newspapers in cities where the corporation has its
headquarters or major facilities.8 9 Should these or other similiar procedures
fail, the corporation should consider whether to disseminate the information
in other ways. For example, it could advertise in newspapers, send a letter to
its stockholders,90 or where appropriate, file with the SEC a Current Report
In order to effect a meaningful public disclosure of corporate information, it must be
disseminated in a manner calculated to reach the securities market place in general through
recognized channels of distribution. . . . Public dissemination of information also cannot be
accomplished by disclosure to or through a favorite analyst or group of analysts.... Proper
and adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments can only be effected by public
release through the appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to
the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or group.
Id. at 83,105.
86. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
87. Id. at 856.
88. (i) [I]fmarket interest in the issuer is nationwide, dissemination should be directed at least
to the financial communities in the several major urban areas across the country;
(ii) if market interest in the issuer is not nationwide but its securities are traded on one or
more exchanges, dissemination should be directed at least to the financial communities in
each city in which such an exchange is located and in each other geographic areas of
known significant market interest; and
(iii) if market interest in the issuer is essentially local or regional and its securities are not
traded on an exchange, dissemination should be directed at least to financial communities
in such locality or region and in any other geographic area of known significant market
interest.
Insider Trading: Some Questions and Some Answers 1 SEC REG. L.L 328, 340 (1974) (Comments of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Subcommittees on Rule lob-5 and Broker-Dealer Matters).
89. Cf. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 403(2), at 106-08; COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-23,
A-24.
90. See Insider Trading: Some Questions and Some Answers, supra note 88, at 338 (listing mailings to
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on Form 8-K.91 Whether these additional procedures must be followed will
vary with the materiality of the information. In any event, liability should be
based on the totality of the corporation's efforts to disseminate. If the
corporation has made an adequate effort, it should be held to have satisfied its
duty, whether or not the information was actually disseminated to investors
in the relevant market.92
TIMING OF DISCLOSURE
The time at which disclosure should be made is the most difficult
determination for the corporation to make. Resolution of the problem will
often require careful balancing of the investor's need for information and the
corporation's need for silence. The corporation will often need time to
investigate carefully, to evaluate the facts, and to utilize those facts for valid
business purposes; during this time investors are trading on incomplete
information. The standard by which the corporation's timing decision is to bejudged should protect a corporation from liability if it acts responsibly in
meeting its disclosure obligations, even if a court could conclude in retrospect
that disclosure should have been made earlier. This standard of review will
ensure that investors receive the information in accordance with the purpose
of the duty and will protect the corporation from liability for honest errors in
judgment. 93 It is important to protect the corporation in this manner because,
ultimately, innocent nontrading stockholders will bear any loss arising from
the wrongful failure to disclose.
Whether a corporation has acted responsibly in the timing of its disclosure
depends on the following: (1) The procedures followed when making the
stockholders as most effective); Current Policy Issues Involving Inside Information in the Securities Market,
1970 SEC. L. REv. 84, 103 (Remarks of A. Fleischer)(recommending stockholder mailings when difficult
to get media to print information). At least one commentator has expressed doubts about the sufficiency of
a mailing to stockholders. See generally Abrams, Insider Trading, 6 REV. SEC. Rao. 889, 893 (1973)
(buyers would not be protected).
91. Form 8-K, Item 5, permits a corporation "at its option [to] report. . . any events, with respect to
which information is not otherwise called for by this form, which the registrant deems of material
importance to security holders." The SEC has used this item to obtain disclosure beyond that required by
its statutory reporting forms and has recognized that corporations voluntarily utilize it when no other
disclosure mechanism is available.
92. [I]t is our view that the transmittal of disclosure information through the most etective
means of communication available (e.g., telephoning to stock exchanges, delivery to wire
services and financial journals, mailing to securityholders, delivery to trade journals, etc.)
should be sufficient to satisfy any obligations of the issuer to effect timely disclosure ...
Of course, this suggestion implicitly imposes in all instances a "good faith" standard in
connection with selection of the most effective available means of dissemination, and in
connection generally with expediting the process of dissemination, to the relevant financial
community or communities.
Insider Trading: Some Questions and Some Answers, supra note 88, at 338. See also Abrams, supra note 90,
at 894 (courts have not dealt with situation in which corporation attempted to disclose but financial
services did not publish information).
93. If the corporation is not protected by this standard, it may disclose too early and either harm its
business position or issue a misleading release because it has not had adequate time to investigate and to
evaluate the facts. In order to avoid these problems, the corporation may disclose too late, when the
information is no longer valuable to investors, and thus subject itself to liability under lOb-5. See 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 5, § 88.04[a], at 4-10.
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timing decision; (2) the standard of review employed by the court; and (3) the
standard of conduct to be applied to the corporation.
A Corporation's Procedures In Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. (FIF) v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.94 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of what
procedures a corporation must follow with respect to the timing of disclosure.
In April 1966, McDonnell Douglas made public projections of its earnings for
that fiscal year.95 One month later, management learned that earnings would
be substantially below the projections, a fact that the corporation disclosed
after a prompt investigation. 96 Two weeks later, however, quarterly profit
figures revealed even larger losses than previously disclosed. This decline
prompted further investigations and resulted in a large inventory write-off.97
The day after an investigation and evaluation of the situation was completed,
the corporation issued another public statement disclosing the full extent of
its financial problems. 98 A stockholder who purchased the corporation's stock
between the two public statements sued, alleging that the corporation had
violated rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose the full decline in earnings before the
second release was issued. 99
The Tenth Circuit held that the corporation had not violated rule lOb-5. 100
With respect to the issue of timing, the court found that the duty to disclose
did not arise until the corporation gathered enough information to issue an
accurate release, verified the information sufficiently for management to have
confidence in its accuracy, and determined that there was no valid business
reason for nondisclosure.1 01 After considering the reasonableness of manage-
ment's decision and the speed with which it was reached, 102 the court found
no proof of a delay with respect to the publication of the earnings forecasts. 103
The court stated that once it was shown that management exercised due care
in gathering and considering the facts, a presumption arose that the evalua-
tion was made in the exercise of good business judgment even though
subsequent events might indicate that the decision was not correct. 104
Under a proper timing standard, if a corporation acts diligently in
investigating and evaluating the relevant facts, its failure to disclose during
that period should not constitute a violation of rule lOb-5. 105 Once the
94. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (per curiam) (en bane), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
95. Id. at 519 (stockholders told at annual meeting that earnings would increase for coming year).
96. Id. at 516. Delays in delivery of supplies and problems with the work force were expected to cause a
reduction in earnings. Id.
97. Id. The problem was uncovered on June 14; investigation was begun three days later and was
completed on June 23. Id.
98. Id. at 516-17.
99. Id. at 517.
100. Id. at 522.
101. Id. at 519; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (dictum)
(10b-5 not violated if corporate management diligent in ascertaining information's truth and releases it in
good faith), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
102. 474 F.2d at 518.
103. Id. at 522.
104. Id. at 521-22.
105. A corporation will often need some time to develop the information fully. Management's
decisionmaking process, however, must be "conducted with reasonable dispatch considering the need to
ascertain the details as to the particular problems, to relate them to other earnings, and to arrive at a
conclusion with confidence, that the statement when issued would be correct." Id. at 518.
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corporation realizes that the facts themselves are material, the accuracy of the
information and the full effect of this information on the corporation's
business may be uncertain.10 6 Before investigation and evaluation are com-
plete, the corporation might have difficulty issuing a release that is sufficiently
accurate and that would not require a series of subsequent releases to update
the original information.107 In a rapidly changing situation, a series of releases
might cause wide fluctuations in the price of the corporation's stock, harming
rather than helping investors. Additionally, the initial release could subject a
corporation to subsequent litigation, with plaintiffs alleging that the original
statement was materially false because it was unduly optimistic or pessimistic
in light of facts that the corporation possessed but did not disclose.
This standard would not allow a corporation to delay disclosure indefinite-
ly pending a business decision based on the relevant facts. Disclosure would
be required if the corporation's board of directors had taken some action, if
senior management had acted in a manner that was likely to be approved by
the board, or if management's decision would not be reviewed by the board.108
A more difficult question is whether disclosure is required when the
corporation knows of the general problem and possible solutions but has
failed to decide how to proceed. Although there is no clear answer, a
corporation can delay disclosure only for a reasonable period of time while
the problem "works itself out"; whether a corporation has acted in a
reasonable manner will depend upon the circumstances of each situation. 109
106. See id. at 518 (corporation aware of labor and supply problems, but needed time to investigate, to
evaluate and compare actual costs with previous cost estimates, and to determine if actual costs reflected
increased inventory value); cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) % 96,602, at 94,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (reasonable for corporation to withhold information about
dramatic drop in monthly earnings when followed by significant revival in following month).
107. A corporation should have a duty to update even if its initial release set forth the relevant facts and
indicated that the situation was in flux. See notes 144-59 infra and accompanying text (discussing duty to
update).
108. See Gilroy, Disclosure and Related Problems of Bad News, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIEs REGULATION 71, 88 (1975) (Transcript Series) (if internal
decision made by senior management to curtail some operation or write-off some assets, and only likely
approval of board remains, disclosure required at that time). [hereinafter cited as SEVENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE]
109. The complexity of this question may be illustrated by the following discussion:
Mr. Sporkin: Suppose a company has a requirements contract that it knows it is not going
to be able to fulfill because to do so will cause serious financial problems. I am thinking, for
example, of contracts where the company contracted to provide energy at a price of $5 a unit,
but now that the cost of production has gone up to $15 per unit, it finds that it is unable to
meet its commitment and will have to default. The company feels that to comply with the
contract would cause serious financial problems. It seems to me that disclosure has to be
made at the time when management knows it is not going to meet the contract, not later, after
the company defaults.
Mr. Fleischer: Does your hypothetical assume that the company had exhausted all possible
negotiating postures with the other party to the contract and cannot arrive at a satisfactory
resolution?
Mr. Sporkin: I am not sure that it is necessary that the company have exhausted all
settlement approaches before disclosure is required. Once management realizes that the
company will have difficulty meeting that contract, I think the event becomes disclosable if
the contract is material.
Mr. Fleiseher: I would disagree with that. There may well be a proper business purpose in
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This problem is likely to arise when a corporation is faced with a generally
deteriorating situation, such as problems with collections, cash-flow, working
capital, or maintenance of credit, rather than with the occurrence of a specific
event. Although the prudent course of action would be to disclose the
existence of serious financial problems, the precise point at which disclosure
would be required is unclear. Generally, if the problem can be characterized
as temporary or if it is likely to be corrected quickly, disclosure is not
required. 110 There are situations, however, in which the effect on the
corporation will be permanent enough to require disclosure of the informa-
tion. 111 In such a case the corporation must disclose business problems before
a major crisis is reached; 112 during the period of deterioration, the harm to
investors from total silence will outweigh both the business advantages of
nondisclosure and the potential burden of updating the initial release.
After appropriate investigation and evaluation, the corporation must
promptly disclose the information unless it can demonstrate a valid business
reason for not doing so. The validity of a particular reason will often be at the
heart of a nondisclosure case because, with hindsight, such a reason is easily
constructed. The most often cited example of a valid business reason is that
discussed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 113 Although TGS completed a
successful drill hole late in November 1963,114 the results were kept con-
fidential and further drilling was delayed until options on the surrounding
land were acquired. 115 Two weeks after the land acquisition program was
completed and the drilling resumed, the corporation issued initial press
releases about the discovery. 116 Neither the question of the timing of
disclosure nor management's conduct in this regard was at issue, but the
court, in dictum, suggested that the secrecy required for a successful land
acquisition program was a valid business purpose justifying delayed disclo-
sure. 117
not disclosing. The company is not confessing liability in connection with the settlement of
litigation. A press release at too early a juncture may seriously injure the company's
negotiating posture. Would it not be adequate if the company disclosed that the company is
about to enter into negotiations under the existing contract which may relieve its burden
somewhat?
Mr. Gilroy: The best advice is to disclose as much as possible as early as possible, but not
to injure the company or its shareholders through an excess of caution.
Id. at 90-91.
110. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,602, at
94,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no duty to disclose dramatic drop in monthly earnings when followed by
significant revival in following month; reasonable to assume drop temporary and not significant).
111. See id. at 94,567.
112. W.T. Grant initially made public disclosure of its decision to close its stores and of its overall
financial problems at the time that it was notifying its vendors. Gilroy, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE,
supra note 108, at 89; id. app. A, at 425-26.
113. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
114. Id. at 843.
115. Id. at 843-44.
116. Id. at 845-47.
117. Id. at 850 n.12. In Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a
subsequent private action for damages, the court held that the corporation had a valid business reason for
nondisclosure until March 27, 1964, when the land acquisition program was substantially completed and
the decision was made to resume drilling. Id. at 1338-39. The court refused to determine on the motions for
summary judgment whether the corporation had a valid business purpose to withhold disclosure after that
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There are other situations in which nondisclosure may be justified. If a
troubled corporation loses a major supplier, customer, or creditor, it is
reasonable for the corporation to believe that disclosure of this fact might lead
to a loss of other suppliers, customers, or creditors'1 8 and impede a
corporation's ability to find substitutes. Similarly, premature disclosure might
jeopardize the acquisition of another corporation" 9 or impede the ability to
liquidate a portion of a corporation's business. 120
Nevertheless, some reasons given to justify nondisclosure are clearly
unacceptable. For example, a corporation cannot refuse to disclose informa-
tion because it fears a decline in the price of its stock. By admitting that this
was its reason for nondisclosure, the corporation would be evidencing an
intent to artificially maintain the price of its stock. 12' Silence based on a
general fear of losing a competitive advantage should also be greeted with
skepticism.122 This argument is easy to put forth and difficult to prove.
Corporations often admit that they know a great deal about what their
competitors are doing, yet claim that their own disclosure would disadvan-
tage them. In the absence of affirmative evidence of substantial competitive
harm, disclosure should be required.
A more difficult question is whether the corporation can justify silence on
the ground that investors have access to the information from other sources.
For example, if a corporation's new product has difficulties that are materi-
ally reducing sales, this information will be known by distributors who sell the
product and securities analysts who follow the industry. Investors still need
corporate disclosure in such a situation, however, because the corporation is
in the best postion to give the most complete and accurate information. On
the other hand, if the ability to determine a fact and to evaluate its
significance is as available to investors as it is to the corporation, the
corporation's silence may be justified. 123
time. Id. at 1338.
The facts in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation illustrate that the duty owed by corporate insiders to
trading stockholders is different from that owed by the corporation to others. The insiders who traded
while the information was undisclosed were held to have violated rule lOb-5. 401 F.2d at 852. At the same
time, the corporation was allowed to purchase the adjoining land without disclosing the information to the
landowners. See id. at 850 n.12. As Jennings and Marsh point out: "[Tlhe legitimate corporate purpose
which exculpated Texas Gulf Sulphur was the wish to do to the adjoining landowners what the individual
defendants were excoriated for doing to their adjoining shareholders." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 950 (4th ed. 1977). To demonstrate this concept
further, it is clear that had the corporation purchased the land for stock rather than for cash, it would have
violated rule lob-5.
118. Halleran, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1024 (1966).
119. Matarese v. Aero Chatillon Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,322, at 91,731-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (valid business reason for nondisclosure until acquired corporation's
stockholders approved merger).
120. See Segal v. Coburn Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,002, at 94,019
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (disclosure of decision to liquidate installment finance business might have impaired
"collectibility of the paper, disturbed credit relations, and forced a precipitous liquidation of the business").
121. This would constitute manipulation under rule l0b-5. The Court has called the word manipulation
"virtually a term of art." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). Manipulation refers
"generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977),
122. An example of this would be a refusal to disclose the earnings of a division of a company because it
would permit a competitor to discern profit margins.
123. See Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (corporation need not disclose
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A Court's Standard of Review Courts have suggested that the timing of
disclosure is a matter of business judgment with which they will not interfere
without evidence of bad faith.124 This suggestion is rooted in the business
'judgment rule, which is traditionally employed by courts to determine the
liability of corporate officers and directors and which provides that directors
and officers generally will not be held liable for errors of judgment if they act
in good faith. 125 The business judgment rule permits corporate managers to
take business risks without incurring liability for good faith mistakes in
judgment 26 and relieves a court of the burden of deciding whether a
particular business decision is in the corporation's best interest. 127
procedures and processing time for "investigational" applications filed with government agency because
information equally available to public); cf. Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir.
1965) (over-the-counter price of corporation's stock readily available and need not be disclosed before
redemption even if requested); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D. Ill. 1971)
(corporation not liable for failure to define in debenture terms such as "convertible," "redeemable," and
"callable" because reasonable investor should know terms or ask broker for definition).
124. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518-19, 521-22 (10th
Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc) (because decision to release earnings statement on other than customary date
discretionary, and record showed defendant exercised good faith, no proof of delay shown for lOb-5
action), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12, 862 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (timing of disclosure discretionary; if information released in good faith lOb-5 not
violated), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). '
125. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir.) (per
curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry., 61 F. Supp. 905, 911
(E.D. Pa. 1945) (directors' good faith decision to negotiate with only one investment house for refunding of
debt not basis for liability in light of previous dealings with company and desire to avoid public bidding
that would adversely affect market of bonds to be called), affd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946);
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-44 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (directors not liable for expenses incurred in
good faith to refinance debt that ICC later denied). See generally Uhlman, The Duty of Corporate Directors
to Exercise Business Judgment, 20 B.U. L. REV. 488, 489-91, 495-98 (1940).
126. The director of a business corporation is given a wide latitude of action. The law does not
seek to deprive him of inititative and daring and vision. Business has its adventures, its
bold adventures; and those who in good faith, and in the interests of the corporation they
serve, embark upon them, are not to be penalized if failure, rather than success, results
from their efforts.
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5-6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
127. Such a decision is generally beyond the courts' expertise.
The court might be called upon to balance probabilities of profitable results to arise from the
carrying out of the one or the other of different plans proposed by or on behalf of different
shareholders in a corporation, and to decree the adoption of that line of policy which seemed
to it to promise the best results, or at least to enjoin the carrying out of the opposite policy.
This is no business for any court to follow.
Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 99 (Ct. App. 1890).
An additional justification for the rule is that in the absence of extreme circumstances such as fraud,
illegality, or waste, minority stockholders should not be able to set aside business decisions made by
directors elected by a majority of the stockholders. Cf. id. (majority stockholders decision to buy
waterworks extension at high price not voidable by minority holders absent bad faith on part of majority).
Professor Manne has stated that the rule was the logical synthesis of the growth of corporate operations
in a competitive free enterprise system and the nineteenth century suspicion of excessive governmental
regulation. The desire to protect directors against liability was incidental to the greater need to erect a
barrier to prevent courts from regulating the activities of corporate managers. Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 270-71 (1967).
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The Tenth Circuit in FIF, conceding that the business judgment rule was
not directly applicable to the corporation, nevertheless concluded without
analysis that the reasons for the rule should be "considered as extended to the
corporate entity."1 28 In a duty to disclose case, this conclusion will not
withstand close scrutiny. The business judgment rule was not intended to
protect the corporation itself in a suit by its stockholders. Rather, it was
designed to encourage corporate officers to take risks when making business
decisions kilowing that the courts will defer to their good faith determina-
tions. If this rule is applied to the corporation's decision to disclose, however,
great latitude afforded timing decisions will encourage corporations to delay
or even forgo disclosure. This will frustrate one of the basic purposes of the
federal securities laws, which is to "substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor.1 29
Moreover, there is no compelling justification for such judicial deference in
a duty-to-disclose case. In determining whether a corporation has made
timely disclosure, a court is deciding whether a particular business decision
not to disclose constitutes a breach of an affirmative statutory duty. The task
of interpreting and applying a statutory rule is within the traditional expertise
of a court, 130 and the court should not refrain from exercising that expertise
simply because the conduct giving rise to the need to disclose involves the
business judgment of corporate management. The plaintiff must satisfy the
burden of going forward with evidence by showing that the corporation had a
duty to disclose at a particular point and that it acted recklessly or
intentionally in failing to do so. At that point, the corporation may come
forward with evidence showing its lack of recklessness or intent with respect
to its timing decision. A court or jury should give weight to management's
judgment with regard to timing, but should not defer completely as it would if
the business judgment rule were applicable. Whether or not the corporation
comes forward with evidence supporting its good faith defense, the plaintiff
has the burden of persuading the court that the corporation's decision was
reckless or intentional. This allocation of the burden of proof protects the
corporation while partial rather than complete deference to management's
judgment on the issue of timing prevents imposition of an almost insuperable
burden on the plaintiff.
Management's Standard of Conduct To recover damages for a breach
of the duty to disclose under rule l0b-5, a plaintiff must prove that scienter
can be inferred from the defendant's conduct.131 In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,132 the Supreme Court defined scienter as "a mental state embrac-
ing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' 33 Thus if a corporation
128. See 474 F.2d at 518 (business judgment rule not directly applicable because plaintiffs challenging
corporation's, not officers', conduct).
129. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
130. Cf. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reviewing court should exercise judicial
function imposed upon it by Congress to keep SEC proceedings within statutory bounds).
131. See.Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (§ 10(b) speaks of manipulation and
deception; court unwilling to extend statute to negligent conduct); note 16 supra.
132. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
133. Id. at 194 n.12.
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intentionally breaches its duty to disclose, its conduct will satisfy the Court's
test.134
In Hochfelder, however, the Court seemed to use the term "knowingly"
interchangeably with "intentional" when describing conduct proscribed by
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.135 The Court thus implied that scienter can be
inferred if the defendant actually knew of an omission or of the falsity of the
statements made. Subsequently, lower courts have followed this interpreta-
tion and have held that actual knowledge permits the inference of scienter.13 6
In addition, the Hochfelder Court left open the question whether intent can be
inferred from reckless conduct;137 subsequent lower court cases have applied
the recklessness standard. 138
In a duty to disclose case, the plaintiff would argue that scienter should be
inferred because the corporation had actual knowledge of the materiality of
the information and the nondisclosure. The corporation would argue, how-
ever, that its exercise of due care and good faith with respect to its duty to
disclose should negate the inference of scienter. Because of the complex
nature of the duty to disclose, a court should examine all aspects of the
corporation's conduct before determining liability. If the court finds that the
conduct was reckless, it should infer that the corporation acted with the
requisite intent to deceive and that the scienter requirement was satisfied.
134. The Court made it clear, however, that negligence will not result in liability in private damage suits.
Id. at 214.
135. "The words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' [in §
10(b)] strongly suggest that 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." Id. at 197
(emphasis added).
136. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1976)
(disclosure of expected profits from deal not yet formally closed as income in annual report held
misleading; scienter requirement satisfied); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080-84 (D. Del.
1976). But see SECv. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1170-72 (E.D. Va. 1977) (initial incorrect
disclosure of certain transactions concerning questionable business expenses, in light of later correction,
insufficient to infer scienter), rev'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978) (proof of scienter
unnecessary in SEC injunction action).
137. "In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5." 425 U.S. at
194 n.12.
By leaving open this question, the Court may have suggested a narrowing of the definition of scienter
under both common law fraud and section 10(b). For the common law tort of misrepresentation or deceit,
"reckless disregard whether [a statement] be true or false" satisfied the requisite intent to deceive or
mislead. W. PROSSER, LAW OFTORTS § 107, at 701(4th ed. 1971). See generally Haimoff, Holmes Looks at
Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147, 151, 154 (1976). Additionally, prior to the decision in
Hochfelder, scienter under rule lOb-5 could be inferred from reckless disregard for the truth. See Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (no liability because willful or reckless
disregard for truth necessary to establish liability under lOb-5).
138. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40, 1043-45 (7th Cir.) (corporation
liable under lOb-5 for reckless nondisclosure of accounting report and reckless disclosure of incorrect
income figures), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993-94 (7th
Cir. 1976) (bank, executor of estate of controlling shareholder, violated lob-5 by causing corporation to
exchange assets for unregistered corporate stock while failing to disclose its own conflict of interest and
wantonly ignoring unfairness of transaction); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080-82 (D. Del.
1976) (either knowingly or recklessly failing to verify accounts receivable sufficient basis for lOb-5
liability); Peltz v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 382, 384 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (allegation auditor
"knew" misleading nature of financial statements sufficient to allege scienter; but allegation auditor
"should have known" stricken because not sufficient to allege recklessness); cf. ALI, FED. SEC. CODE §
299.50 (Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 15, 1978) (recklessness sufficient to find scienter).
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Courts should use this method of analysis with respect to each segment of
the corporation's timing decision-its investigation and evaluation of the
facts and the validity of its claim that there was a business reason for
nondisclosure or delay. As to the investigation and evaluation of the facts, a
court should examine the procedures the corporation followed in deciding
whether disclosure was warranted. Scienter should be inferred from the
corporation's behavior only if the corporation acted either willfully with
intent to deceive or recklessly with respect to its investigation and evaluation
of the facts.
This analysis can be illustrated by considering a corporation that is faced
with the loss of a major customer. Its investigation and evaluation of the facts
have two related purposes: determining the impact on its business operations
and determining the need for disclosure. In a duty-to-disclose case the court
will be concerned only with the latter. If the corporation investigates and
evaluates its disclosure obligations promptly, it will not have acted with
scienter. If, however, it intentionally decides not to disclose or fails to
consider its disclosure obligation, the requisite scienter can be found or
inferred through recklessness.
Whether the corporation's timing decison was reckless is a more difficult
question when the corporation defends its decision on the ground that it had a
valid business reason for nondisclosure or delay. In such a case, in order to
infer scienter from reckless conduct, a court should determine both that the
reason was invalid and that the corporation was reckless in its belief that the
reason was valid.139 In some cases any such belief will be reckless. A
corporation should always be found to have acted recklessly, for example, if it
asserts as a valid business reason for nondisclosure or delay the fear that
disclosure would result in a decline in its stock price. This reason will never be
a valid business reason justifying nondisclosure or delay, and it is reckless to
believe that it would be valid. There will be other situations, however, in
which the corporation's belief that the business reason was valid will not have
been reckless, even though the reason is found to be invalid. Such a situation
arises, for example, when management fears that disclosure would competi-
tively disadvantage the corporation through loss of customers. In such
situations, the totality of the circumstances must be examined. 40
139. Obviously, if the business reason is valid, the question of recklessness need not be addressed.
140. A corporation will often seek and rely on advice of counsel when determining whether and when
disclosure must be made. If either of the decisions of the corporation with respect to materiality and timing
are challenged, the corporation will argue that reliance on counsel should prevent any finding of
recklessness. It has been suggested that a corporation may rely successfully on the advice of counsel to
protect it from liability if it takes the following steps: (1) It must select counsel which it reasonably believes
competent; (2) it must disclose all material facts to counsel; (3) it must receive erroneous advice from
counsel on a question of law (as contrasted with a question of fact, on which counsel has no expertise); and
(4) it must act in accordance with counsel's advice. See Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as
a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REy. 19 (1976). See also Floor, The Scienter
Requirement Under Rule 10b-5 and Reliance on Advice of Counsel After Hochfelder, 12 NEW ENGLAND L.
REv. 191, 217 (1976) (listing four steps for reliance on counsel).
If a court applying this test finds that the corporation acted recklessly with respect to any one step, the
corporation should be found to have acted recklessly with respect to its reliance on counsel. In such a case,
the court should infer the requisite "intent to deceive" necessary for a finding of scienter notwithstanding
the corporation's efforts to seek advice of counsel. Floor, supra, at 217-21 (after Hochfelder, standard to
evaluate whether reliance defense valid in private damage action should be something more than mere
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IV. SPECIAL DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS
Thus far, this article has discussed only the duty to disclose information
concerning matters on which the corporation has not previously spoken. A
corporation may also have an obligation to update previously disclosed
information that is no longer accurate and to correct material misstatements
made by corporate officials or people outside the corporation. Finally, some
information, such as financial projections, is sufficiently unique to warrant
separate treatment.
DUTY TO UPDATE
The reason for requiring a corporation to update its prior statements is
clear; previously disclosed information may leave a false and misleading
impression with investors if not updated. 141 Taken to its extreme, this position
would compel a corporation to disclose whenever there was a material change
in any of its previous statements, regardless of the materiality of the previous
statement at the time of the change or the length of time since the original
statement. Although this extreme is not now 42 and should not become the
law, a corporation should have an obligation to update previously disclosed
material information if an investor could reasonably rely on the continuing
accuracy of that information. 143
negligence). If negligence is the standard of conduct in an SEC injunctive action, the defendant in such an
action must show due care and not merely a lack of recklessness in satisfying these four elements. See
Floor, supra, at 218-19. Whatever standard is used, however, Floor concludes that Hochfelder is likely to
enhance the effectiveness of the advice of counsel defense because it would seem impossible to impute
reckless or willfull conduct to a defendant who took the positive step of consulting counsel in good faith,
but negligently failed to comply with one of the four steps. Id. at 221-22.
The principal problem posed by the reliance on counsel analysis is whether the validity of the business
reason is a question of law or fact. If it is a question of law, the corporation may rely on counsel's advice. If
it is a question of fact, reliance would be unjustified and the defense could not rebut a finding of
recklessness.
In most situations counsel's advice will have been rendered only after complex legal and factual
questions have been answered. Hawes & Sherrard, supra, at 30. Thus it will be difficult if not impossible for
corporations to determine whether the existence of a valid business reason is a question of law or fact, and
therefore, whether it can justifiably rely on counsel's advice.
Because corporations should be encouraged to seek advice on how to comply with newly developing
legal standards such as the duty to disclose, counsel's advice should not be limited to legal areas but should
include mixed questions of fact and law. In a mixed-question situation, the corporation should be permitted
to rely on counsel's advice only if the corporation could have reached in good faith the same decision with
respect to the validity of the business decision. A corporation should not be able to interpose the defense of
reliance on counsel if it would have been reckless for the corporation to have reached the same decision on
its own.
141. Cf. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239,243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dictum) (failure to correct
misleading statements and to disclose when duty to do so exists may mislead investors and constitute
fraud).
142. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., [1979] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) S 96,737, at 94,895 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
8, 1979) (duty exists only when investors' continued reliance on original statement is reasonable). See also
Schneider, Developments in 1934 Act Reporting, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 89, 91-92 (1972) (Transcript Series) (duty exists only in special
circumstances, including insider trading and tipping).
143. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., [1979] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) % 96,737, at 94,895 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
8, 1979). The Robins court's willingness to recognize the duty to update indicates that a lower court may
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There is very little case law dealing with the duty to update. In one early
case a court indicated that a corporation would not be liable under rule 1Ob-5
for its failure to update unless it had benefited from its failure to do so, or had
sought to affect the market price of its stock for the benefit of itself or its
insiders.44 It is unclear, however, in light of dicta in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. 145 whether courts today will require a finding of benefit.
In a recent case-Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc.' 46-the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that there is a duty
to update prior accurate statements that have become misleading due to
subsequent events.147 In this case the corporation had stated in its 1970 annual
stockholder report that its product, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine contracep-
tive device, was safer and more effective than other similar devices on the
market. 48 In its 1971 annual stockholder report the shield was described as
"highly successful," and in a 1972 prospectus the corporation described its
plans to introduce the device to international markets. 149 Plaintiffs alleged
that these statements had been rendered misleading by a subsequent undis-
closed report indicating that the device was not as safe or effective as Robins
claimed, 150 and that several product liability suits had been filed against the
company.' 51 The court held that the plaintiffs' claim was cognizable under
rule 10b-5, but that they had failed to state the facts supporting an allegation
of fraud with particularity as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 152 Noting that the passage of time eventually would render prior
statements immaterial, the court stated that the duty to revise exists as long as
an investor can reasonably rely on the continuing accuracy of the prior
statement. 53 The court also stated that the duration of the duty will vary with
the circumstances of each case, and will depend on the importance of the
initially released information and the nature of later information.15 4 On the
soon accept the general duty to disclose. If the corporation complies with the general duty to disclose, the
duty to update does not impose a separate burden, because in the latter situation the corporation has
previously disclosed information that is now inaccurate. It appears, therefore, that there is a lower
threshold of materiality in a duty-to-update situation, making this duty a more extensive one.
144. SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
145. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (dictum) (Congress
did not intend to predicate l0b-5 liability on benefit to corporation), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
The most recent case on the duty to update does not address this issue. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,
[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,737, at 94,895 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1979).
146. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,737 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1979).
147. Id. at 94,895. Although the decision is ambiguous, the court apparently limited the duty to those
statements made by the corporation, such as annual stockholder reports, that are not filed with the SEC.
Id. at 94,899. The second part of the court's holding, that section 18 of the 1934 Act provides the sole
remedy for failure to update documents filed with the SEC, appears to be incorrect; section 18 imposes
liability only if the document was misleading at the time of filing. Id. at 94,896-99; see 1934 Act § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
148. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 94,895.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 94,894. The report was completed in April 1972, and Robins did not correct its earlier
statements until 1974. Id. The plaintiffs had purchased Robins stock in 1973. Id.
151. Id.
152. I'd. at 94,899. The court dismissed for failure to comply with rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that all averments of mistake or fraud be pleaded with particularity. Id. at
94,895-96.
153. Id. at 94,895.
154. Id.
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facts before it, the court suggested that the defendant would have had a duty
to update its initial disclosure.1 55
Although the Robins case suggests a duty to update based on a standard of
reasonable reliance, the decision does not elaborate adequately the factors a
court must consider when deciding whether an investor's expectations that
the prior statement is still accurate are reasonable. Such a determination
requires examination of the type of information in the original statement, the
predictive nature of the statement, and the length of time between the original
statement and the current information. Predictiveness describes the extent to
which the statement permits inferences to be drawn about the corporation's
future conduct. 156 The duty to update will extend for a longer period of time if
the initial statement is highly predictive, because a reasonable investor would
expect such a statement, as opposed to one that is less predictive, to remain
accurate for a longer period unless corrected. For the same reasons, there is
more likely to be a duty to update a recent statement than one issued in the
distant past.
This analysis raises the question of what knowledge a reasonable investor
should be presumed to possess. For example, investors should realize that a
corporation's financial position is constantly fluctuating.1 57 Earnings and
sales will vary with general economic conditions and, in some situations, with
political developments. In addition, investors should be presumed to know
that some industries, by their very nature, are unpredictable due to rapid
technological change or other developments. Finally, investors should be held
to have constructive knowledge of some information that has been widely
disseminated by sources other than the corporation.158 Although these
considerations do not provide a clear test for determining when to update in a
particular case, they do establish a framework for addressing the issue, as the
following examples illustrate.
If a corporation announces an agreement in principle to merge and a
material change occurs shortly thereafter, the parties have three courses of
action:They may materially alter the terms of the merger, obtain approval of
the respective boards of directors, or terminate the agreement. Whichever
course is chosen, the corporation should be required to update its initial
announcement by disclosing this new material information. 159 Although the
initial disclosure is not expressly predictive, the nature of the information-an
agreement in principle only, and thus subject to change-creates an expecta-
tion that material changes will be disclosed promptly. In addition, the time
155. Id.
156. Every statement is predictive insofar as it permits inferences and assumptions about the future,
even if it purports to refer only to the point in time at which it was made. For example, a statement that "it
is the policy of the corporation not to make questionable or illegal payments," although speaking of present
policy, is predictive insofar as it permits inferences about the corporation's future conduct. Nevertheless,
some statements are more clearly predictive than others, either because they make explicit predictions
("the corporation will earn $5.00 per share next year") or because they relate to events that will happen in
the future ("the corporation will spend $10 million on research and development next year").
157. The assumption that a corporation is constantly changing in nature may underlie the court's
assertion in Ross that time may eventually render any statement immaterial. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,
[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,737, at 94,895 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1979).
158. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
159. Cf. SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) % 93,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (company advertised agreement in principle to merge but failed
to announce subsequent lapse of agreement; officer who traded enjoined under lOb-5).
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between the disclosure of the agreement in principle and any change will
generally be short enough to warrant disclosure.
A more difficult problem arises if a corporation engaged in mineral
exploration makes a material discovery shortly after issuing a routine press
announcement of drilling results for the previous year stating that "no
commercial ore body" had been discovered and that "drilling is continuing."
The corporation may be assumed to have a valid business reason for not
disclosing the material discovery. An investor in such a case would argue that
the prior disclosure, although not expressly predictive, implied that any
discovery affecting the "no commerical ore body" statement would be
disclosed. The investor could further argue that having disclosed the status of
the drilling, reliance on the valid business reason would no longer be
warranted because to do so would knowingly leave false information out-
standing in the market. These arguments, however, should not prevail. The
statement that no commercial ore body was found is not predictive; it simply
reports past results. The statement that "drilling is continuing" is predictive
only if it refers to explorations at a specific location; it does not suggest that
specific results are anticipated. Even if the statement is considered predictive,
the nature of the business of exploring for minerals is so unpredictable that a
reasonable investor should be presumed to know that announced results may
quickly become outdated and that there will often be a legitimate need for
nondisclosure even though investors may be harmed.
Two variations of the facts in the Robins case will further illustrate the
interplay of the various factors courts should consider when determining the
reasonableness of the investors' expectations. First, assume that shortly after
Robins announces that the Dalkon Shield is safer and more effective than
other similar contraceptives on the market the corporation learns of an
unpublished study finding that the shield is unsafe. Although the statement is
not directly predictive, it is reasonable for investors to believe that the product
has been tested and proven safe, and that disclosure will be made if this
finding is contradicted. If the contents of the study are within the peculiar
knowledge of the corporation or are otherwise not generally available to
investors, updating should be required. Similarly, even if the unpublished
study receives extensive coverage in the financial media, such as the Wall
Street Journal, the corporation should have a duty to confirm or to deny the
contents of the study because investors could not adequately evaluate the
accuracy of the report.
On the other hand, there would be no duty to update if, one week after
Robins' initial disclosure, a competitor introduces a safer and more effective
device. Although the original statement was indirectly predictive and the time
lapse short, Robins should not have to update; the investor should be
presumed to know that competition often results in the introduction of new
and potentially better products into the market. Moreover, this new informa-
tion will undoubtedly have been disclosed by its competitors and no
confirmation should be required of Robins.
THE DUTY TO CORRECT
The duty to update applies to a corporation's statements that have become
misleading as a result of subsequent events. There is no question about the
reasonableness of investor belief that the statements were accurate when
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released; the concern is with continued investor reliance on these statements.
The duty to correct applies to material misstatements made by corporate
officials or persons outside the corporation rather than to misstatements made
by the corporation itself. Although it would be unreasonable to hold a
corporation responsible for the accuracy of all statements made by such
persons, a duty to correct is appropriate in certain circumstances.
One test for determining whether the corporation has a duty to correct was
suggested by the decision in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp.160 In seeking to enjoin a tender offer by International Controls
Corp.(ICC), Electronic Specialty (ELS) alleged that ICC had failed to correct
certain misstatements that had appeared in a Wall Street Journal article
concerning the amount of ELS stock owned by ICC and the possible price at
which a tender offer for ELS stock might be made.16' ELS also alleged that
Robert Vesco, the president of ICC, had made other misrepresentations in an
effort to force down the price of ELS stock and had used the story, knowing
its inaccuracies, as a negotiating device to mislead ELS into a merger1 62
between the two companies. The district court held ICC liable and granted a
preliminary injunction. 163 It found that ICC, acting through Vesco-"its chief
executive officer and dominating personality"-had misled both ELS and
public investors about its intention to make a tender offer, and had at least
permitted the publication of what it knew to be false statements about the
number of shares of ELS stock that it owned. 164 Although the court failed to
articulate its reasoning, it appears that ICC was held liable either because
Vesco had apparent authority to speak for the corporation1 65 or because he
was acting on behalf of the corporation. 66
160. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'g in part 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
161.295 F. Supp. at 1075. On July 31, 1968, shortly before the offer, an article in the Wall Street Journal
reported that ICC might make a tender offer for ELS at $45-50 per share and that "according to brokerage
house reports" ICC owned approximately five percent of the stock of ELS. Neither of these statements was
true; ICC owned only two and one-half percent and as of that date the Board of Directors of ICC had not
authorized any offer. Id.
162. Id. at 1075-76.
163. Id. at 1082-83.
164. Id. at 1076.
165. Cf SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1975) (broker-dealer liable for
violations of lob-5 by its vice-president because he acted with apparent authority). Apparent authority
exists when a person (the investor), as a result of manifestations made to him by a principal (the
corporation), reasonably believes that a third party (the corporate employee) is the principal's agent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 & Comments a and c (1957). Therefore, an investor who knows
that someone is a corporate employee will be justified in believing that the employee has authority to do
those things that employees of his type customarily do. See id. § 27, Comment d. Under agency principles,
a corporation is liable for the fraudulent activities of an employee who acted with apparent authority, even
if the employee commits the fraud solely for his own benefit. Id. §§ 261, 262 & Illustration 1. The rationale
for holding the corporation liable is that the employee's position facilitates commission of the fraud because
the victim cannot normally ascertain that the employee is acting fraudulently and for his own benefit. See
id. § 261, Comment a; id. § 262, Comment a.
Several decisions imply that the duty to correct depends on whether the corporation benefits from its
silence or from a misstatement. Compare Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (statement detrimental to corporation; no duty to correct) with Green v. Jonhop,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973) (corporation benefited from failure to correct misstatements because
stock price rose; liable for failure to correct). The more demonstrable and direct the benefit, the greater the
argument supporting the duty. See Peacock, Correcting Rumors, 6 REv. SEC. REG. 901, 905 (1973) (agency
principles indicate that allegation of a benefit is not necessary when agency principles are applied).
166. When an officer speaks . n behalf of the corporation, the statement is not his, but that of the
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The Second Circuit reversed the finding of liability, however, on the
ground that the record did not support the finding that Vesco's actions were,
in effect, those of ICC.167 The court also found that neither ICC nor Vesco
was the source of the erroneous story;168 the court reasoned that the story was
detrimental to ICC because it forced the price of ELS stock to a level that
temporarily aborted the tender offer.169 The court held that "while a company
may choose to correct a misstatement not attributable to it . . .we find
nothing in the securities legislation requiring it to do so."170
It is possible to interpret this holding, as one court has done, to mean that a
corporation does not have a duty to correct when the misstatement is not
made by the corporation itself. 171 A better reading of the decision, however, is
that the Second Circuit implied that a corporation will have a duty to correct
if there is an agency relationship between the maker of the misstatement and
the corporation and the statement is within the scope of the maker's
employment. 72 Although the federal courts have divided sharply on the
applicability of common law agency principles to actions brought under rule
lOb-5, t73 it is appropriate to apply these principles in the case of the duty to
corporation. It will often be difficult to distinguish an officer's personal statements from those made for the
corporation, and the bases for drawing such a distinction are beyond the scope of this article. This difficulty
is itself a reason for holding a corporation liable for the misstatements of employees who speak with
apparent authority. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 262, Comment a (1957) (because one
cannot normally ascertain whether agent is in fact acting for principal's benefit, it is rational to hold
principal liable for agent who commits fraud for his own benefit while acting with apparent authority).
167. 409 F.2d at 951.
168. Id. at 949. The Second Circuit also reversed the district court's finding of fact that Vesco had
misled ELS and the public about ICC's intention to make a tender offer. Id. at 949-51. Judge Feinberg
dissented on this point: "No matter how phrased, these are findings of fact which are supported by the
record and should not be overturned. . . . [ihe effect of. . . the majority opinion is not only to
minimize the whole episode. . . but to preempt the trial court's function in this significant area." Id. at
954 (Feinberg, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. Id. at 949.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. See Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658, 662-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
172. It should be noted that the Third Circuit has refused to hold a corporation liable under agency
principles for false statements made by its president to a shareholder who knew that the president was
acting in his own interests rather than those of the corporation. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 586
(3d Cir. 1975). This result is clearly not inconsistent with the duty to correct, because the duty is premised
in part on the average investor's inability to distinguish an officer's personal statements from his statements
on behalf of the corporation. See note 166 supra.
173. Compare SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1975) (legislative history
of 1933 and 1934 Acts contains no clear evidence that agency principles should not apply; broker-dealer
liable for manipulations by vice-president because vice-president acted with apparent authority) and Kerbs
v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 741 (10th Cir. 1974) (corporation liable for sale of fraudulent stock
certificate by president who acted with apparent authority) and SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046,
1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (corporation-issuer generally liable "for what can be deemed the corporate acts of its
principal agents") with Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975) (legislative
history indicates that § 20(a) of 1934 Act preempts common law agency principles; corporation not liable
for fraudulent acts of president because he traded for his own account and because victim knew that
president was not acting for corporation) and Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.
1975) (newspaper corporation not liable under respondeat superior theory for fraudulent act of its financial
columnist because § 20(a) sole remedy). See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 714 (1977) (collecting
cases). Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of
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correct in order to protect investors from trading on the basis of misinforma-
tion.174
Respondeat superior liability, however, should exist only for statements
attributable to the corporation. In deciding whether an erroneous statement is
attributable to a corporation, a court should consider the position of the
person who made the misstatement. There should be no duty to correct
statements made by low-level employees whose positions within the corpora-
tion would not normally authorize them to disclose information.175 Reasona-
ble investors would not believe that such persons have authority to speak for
the corporation, and it would be unduly harsh to impose liability on the
corporation for such statements 176 because, as a practical matter, a corpora-
tion cannot police the actions of all its employees.
When the person who made the statement is a middle orl high-level
employee, the duty to correct should turn primarily on whether the corpora-
tion has adopted procedures for disclosure that are designed to reduce the risk
that misinformation will be disseminated.177 If the corporation has such
procedures and enforces them, it would be inappropriate to use agency
principles to impose liabilty on the corporation; in such a case, the person
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
Courts that take the position that section 20(a) preempts common law agency principles argue that the
"good faith" defense of section 20(a) would be negated by the strict application of agency principles. See
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95
(N.D. Cal. 1974). 1
174. Cf. text accompanying note 141 supra (duty to correct imposed because investors might otherwise
be misled by misinformation). One court has suggested that use of agency principles may be appropriate
only when it will further the policies of the securities laws. See SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 54 (2d Cir.
1976). In the case of the duty to correct, use of agency principles will further the policy embodied in rule
lOb-5 of minimizing the amount of misinformation in securities markets.
In contrast, application of section 20(a) of the 1934 Act would provide less protection for investors
because the corporation is liable only if it fails to act in good faith or induces the misstatements. See 1934
Act § 20a, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). In addition, one court has limited the applicability of section 20(a) to
suits brought by private parties. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974) (§ 20(a) may not be
relied upon by the SEC in an injunction enforcement action), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 265(1) (1957) (principal liable only for agent's
statements made within scope of agent's authority).
176. Cf. SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to hold brokerage firm liable
under agency doctrine of respondeat superior for violations of lOb-5 committed by registered representa-
tive).
177. In order to make clear who can speak for the corporation, procedures should be adopted for the
public disclosure of information that will reduce the risk that misinformation will be publicly disseminated.
Examples of such procedures include the following: Designation of certain officials as the only authorized
spokesmen for the corporation; the appointment of special personnel to monitor corporate developments
and to review press releases for completeness and accuracy; and the employment of financial public
relations firms to promulgate information widely and promptly.
For a discussion and analysis of different types of procedures that a corporation might adopt, see Mann,
Prevention of Improper Securities Transactions by Employees: The Responsibility for and Feasibility of
Adopting Preventative Programs, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 375-88 (1974); Flom & Atkins, The Expanding
Scope of SEC Disclosure Laws, HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 115-18 (July-Aug. 1974), and, for a more complete
discusion, Bromberg, Disclosure Programs for Publicly Held Companies-A Practical Guide, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 1139, 1150-79.
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making the statement should be held to have acted outside the scope of his
authority. 178 If the corporation has no such procedures, however, it is more
equitable to require the corporation to correct the misstatement than for
investors to bear the risk of trading on the basis of misinformation.
In some situations, however, even these procedures should not relieve the
corporation of its duty to correct. For example, a corporation should be
obligated to correct when its president, knowing that his statement is
materially false and in violation of the corporation's procedures, publicly
announces that "the corporation has ceased making questionable payments."
The authority of the president is such that he must be presumed to be
speaking on behalf of the corporation. 179 Similarly, depending on the materi-
ality of a misstatement and the extent of its dissemination, a corporation may
be required to correct a misstatement made in violation of the corporation's
procedures if those responsible for enforcing the procedures learn of the
misstatement. In the latter case, the harm to investors outweighs the burden
on the corporation to correct the misstatements.
The duty to correct also may be based on the relationship between the
corporation and a person not employed by the corporation who has made the
misstatements. This basis for liability underlies the decision in Green v.
Jonhop, Inc.,180 in which a corporation (Jonhop) and one of its officers were
held to have aided and abetted violations of rule lOb-5; they failed to correct
certain misstatements made by a broker-dealer, which also served as the
corporation's investment banker and principal market-maker for its securi-
ties. 181 The broker-dealer, American Western Securities, Inc. (American
Western), issued two market letters containing projected sales and earnings
for the corporation that Jonhop's executive vice-president' 82 knew to be
materially inaccurate. 183 The executive said nothing to American Western
about the first letter, advised an officer of American Western of the
inaccuracies in the second, but made no public correction of either, and failed
to correct the misstatements in sales meetings during which the letters were
discussed.184
The court found that the corporation's silence encouraged public reliance
on the misrepresentations because "it was well known that American Western
was the underwriter and principal dealer in Jonhop stock."' 185 Thus, silence
178. Cf SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1976) (inappropriate to apply agency
principles to enjoin brokerage house that exercised reasonable supervision over employee who violated lOb-
5).
179. See note 166 supra; cf. SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (dictum) (approving
SEC's assertion that corporation should be liable for tipping by its chief executive officer because his acts
were "necessarily in his official capacity"); SEC v. American Beef Packers, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,079, at 91,876 (D. Neb. 1977) (president's knowledge of falsity of statement
imputed to corporation in determining corporation's liability for misstatement in proxy statement).
180. 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973).
181. Id. at 419-20.
182. The officer was also a director and principal stockholder. Id. at 416.
183. Id. at 416-18.
184. Id. at 416, 418.
185. Id. at 419. In support of this point the court relied on Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). In that case the defendant corporation knew
that a broker who dealt extensively in its securities was evidently using his customers' money as working
capital, in violation of the securities laws. Id. at 150-51. Although the corporation threatened to report the
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"amounted to a tacit agreement with American Western to encourage
investors to buy and hold Jonhop stock. ' 186 The court recognized the close
relationship between the corporation and American Western and acknowl-
edged that a corporation could not be responsible for every misstatement
made by a broker-dealer or securities salesman. 87 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that a corporation was "obligated to take some action when it
learns of such misstatements or omissions and is aware that their publication
or nonpublication will be misleading to members of the investing public.' 88
On its facts, Jonhop was correctly decided. It would be reasonable for
investors to rely on the report of a broker-dealer that has such a close
relationship with a corporation. Similarly, a corporation should be required to
correct when a representative of the broker-dealer is a member of the
corporation's board of directors. In this latter situation, an investor could
reasonably conclude that the corporation knew the contents of the broker-
dealer's report or that the broker-dealer had obtained information from the
director. 189
The Jonhop courts articulation of a corporation's duty is too broad,
however; it would require correction whenever a corporation knew of the
contents of a market letter, regardless of the extent of its participation in the
preparation of that letter. In many cases, a corporation will give factual
information to a securities analyst preparing a market letter but will not
comment on the conlusions the analyst draws from that information even if
activity to the State Securities Commissioner, it never did so; indeed, when customers inquired why their
stock had not been delivered, Midwestern referred them back to the broker. Id. at 152-53. The court relied
on a "silence theory" to find the corporation liable for aiding and abetting the broker's violation of rule
10b-5. The court stated that "by failing to report [the broker's] activities to the SEC or the Indiana
Securities Commission, [Midwestern] knowingly and purposefully encouraged an artificial build-up in the
market for its stock so that it would be in a more favorable position. . . . Midwestern's acquiescence
through silence in the fraudulent conduct. . . combined with its affirmative acts was a form of aiding and
abetting cognizable under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Id. at 154.
For a thorough discussion of this "silence theory," see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 597, 620-46 (1972). For a discussion of cases subsequent to Brennan see Ruder, Factors
Determining the Degree of Culpability Necessary for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws in Information
Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 571, 587-90 (1975).
186. 358 F. Supp. at 420.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. This situation raises problems for the broker-dealer similar to those found in the so-called "Chinese
Wall" cases, in which the issue typically is whether the trading or advisory activities of a broker-dealer firm
violate rule lOb-5 when a representative of that firm has obtained confidential information because of the
firm's role as investment banker for the corporation. See, e.g., Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. Re. (CCH) 94,329, at 95,131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (broker-dealer
that obtains adverse information while acting as corporation's investment banker cannot recommend that
coporation's stock to customers); In re Investor's Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 647 n.28 (1971)
(SEC considers sale of stock by broker-dealer suspect if preceded by receipt of inside information). See
generally Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50
N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975); Chazen, Reinforcing the Chinese Wall: A Response, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 552
(1976); Lipton & Mazur The Chinese Wall: A Reply to Chazen, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 579 (1976).
In the case of the duty to correct, however, the issue is the corporation's duty to disclose, not the broker-
dealer's duty to construct a "Chinese Wall" to isolate those of its employees with inside information. The
corporation's duty to correct would exist regardless of the presence of a "Chinese Wall" because investors
expect accurate reporting.
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the corporation knows those conclusions are materially incorrect. 190 In such
cases, if the analyst has no special relationship with the corporation, there
should be no duty to correct. Investors should not assume that the conclu-
sions in a report, even when based on data furnished by the corporation,
represent the views of the corporation. Similarly, absent evidence of special
relationship, a corporation should not be obligated to correct a material
misstatement in a report whose conclusions it did not review. Conversely,
there should be a duty to correct if the corporation has commented on the
conclusion.
Perhaps the most difficult situation under this analysis occurs when a
report based on data, but not conclusions, obtained from the corporation is
prepared by a securities analyst acknowledged to be an expert in the
corporation's industry. Because investors will probably rely on that person's
views, and because the corporation should know about this reliance, it
arguably should have a duty to correct material misstatements in the expert's
report. On the other hand, if that analyst has no special relationship with the
corporation, it would be unfair to impose a duty on a corporation that did not
solicit the report and refused to comment on its conclusions, because investors
are relying on the status of the analyst rather than the corporation's duty to
make accurate disclosure.
PROJECTIONS
The difficulty in establishing firm general rules for the duty to disclose can
be illustrated by analyzing a corporation's obligation to disclose its internal
projections of sales and earnings. 191 Projections are material information;
hence, under the duty to disclose set forth in this article, a corporation would
have to disclose its projections, as well as update them whenever there is a
material change. 192 Because projections differ from other material facts,
however, it is the position of this article that the general duty to disclose and
to update should not apply to them.
Projections differ from other facts, such as dividend declarations or
potential mergers, and are intrinsically more uncertain because they are based
on numerous facts and assumptions that are subject to frequent change and
190. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,602, at
94,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporation submitted factual data from which analyst made faulty projections;
no duty to correct because corporation refused to comment on accuracy of projections).
191. For an excellent discussion of problems relevant to disclosure of projections and appraisals, see
generally Kripke, Projections and Appraisals: Analysis of the Case Law, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE,
supra note 108, at 93; Mann, Securities Act Release No. 5581: An Analysis, in SEvENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE, supra note 108, at 109; Ruder, Disclosure of Financial Projections-Developments, Problems
and Techniques, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, F1FrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 5 (1974) (rranscript Series) [hereinafter cited as FiFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE]; Schneider, Financial
Projections-Practical Problems and Disclosure, in FiFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra, at 47.
192. Investors are interested in knowing a corporation's opinion about its future sales and earnings when
making investment decisions. Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus.
LAw. 293, 298 (1975); Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1151, 1164-70 (1970); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine
Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222, 224 (1971); see Ruder, in FiFrH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 191, at 15-16; Schneider, supra note 41, at 280-83; cf. Ruder, in FIFTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra, at 16-17 (Remarks of Carl Schneider).
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reinterpretation. 193 Indeed, it could be argued that by their very nature
projections are almost never "ripe" for disclosure as that term was used by the
Tenth Circuit in FIF in discussing when the duty to disclose arises. 194
Many corporations have resisted making their internal projections public
either because they believe that projections are so inherently unreliable that
they are misleading, or because they fear liability if actual results vary
materially from the projections. 195 Additionally, recognizing that projections
often fluctuate, corporations are unwilling to assume the duty to determine
the materiality of each change in their projections and to update previous
estimates each time there is such a change.
A corporation could raise these arguments of uncertainty and flux
whenever it did not wish to disclose particular information. This article
rejects these arguments as generally unpersuasive. 196 When dealing with
projections, however, courts should recognize that the inherently uncertain
nature of projections, together with the burdens that a duty to disclose
projections would impose on corporations, outweigh any potential benefits
that disclosure of projections would provide.
If a court is unwilling to accept this argument, however, it could adopt the
position suggested by the SEC that corporations should be required to
disclose projections publicly only if they have been disclosed on a selective
basis to persons outside the corporation.197 The rationale behind this alterna-
193. Ruder, in FIFTH ANNUALINSTITUTE, supra note 191,at 10-12; see Heller, Disclosure Requirements
Under Federal Securities Regulations, 16 Bus. LAW. 300, 307 (1961) (projections are mere conjecture, not
facts); cf. Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-75 (1971)
(many "facts" are mere probabilities, not certainties).
194. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc., v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.) (per
curiam) (en bane), cert denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); notes 94-104 supra and accompanying text.
195. Courts differ significantly in the approach they use to determine whether a corporation should be
liable for issuing an erroneous projection. Compare Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(corporation held to "high standard of care"; liable for failure to disclose assumptions underlying
projection) with Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (no liability when documents
upon which projections based reasonably prepared and reviewed). See Schneider, Financial Projections, 7
REv. SEC. REG. 907, 907-10 (1974). See also Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489-90 (9th
Cir. 1974) (dictum) (liability if corporation did not believe forecast, knew of reason to believe result would
be different, or made forecast without reasonable preparation); REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 410
F. Supp. 192, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that forecasts based on outdated calculations would render
corporation liable had plaintiff proved reliance); Schuller v. Slick Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,065, at 97,739 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (although projections and underlying data
erroneous, no liability because defendant not reckless in preparation).
196. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
197. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,167, at 85,299 (Apr. 28, 1975). Prior to 1973 the SEC prohibited projections in statutory filings. The
Commission believed that projections were inherently unreliable and that investors would give them too
much credence if they were included. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 52, at 96. The SEC's prohibition,
however, was not absolute. For example, it required disclosure in Securities Act registration statements of
future costs of labor and materials as a risk factor. See Schneider, supra note 41, at 260 (arguing that more
"soft" information may be beneficial to investors). The Commission also took the position as amicus curiae
that appraisals of future value might have to be disclosed in a proxy statement. Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogomo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified and affd, 478 F.2d 1281, 1291-94 (2d Cir.
1973). But see Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447, 451-52 (10th Cir. 1968)
(omission from proxy statement of information about unproved oil reserves not misleading). The SEC
reversed its traditional position on projections in 1973 and proposed to allow them in statutory filings. The
SEC also proposed to subject corporations to additional filing requirements when they made projections
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tive is that those investors to whom the projections are disclosed have an
informational advantage over other investors. 98 The corporation should not
be permitted to create this informational inequality; thus projections become
material for purposes of triggering a disclosure obligation that will minimize
the inequality.199
The duty to correct an outside projection should apply only when the
projection is clearly attributable to the corporation, as is the case when the
source of the projection has a special relationship with the corporation. 20 0
Because the duty to correct projections places such a heavy burden on a
corporation, a court should be careful to apply the attribution test narrowly
when projections are involved. Analysts often base their projections on
information obtained from many sources, including both publicly available
statutory filings and private interviews with corporate personnel. 20 1 Because
virtually all of the information obtained in this manner can be attributed to
voluntarily, whether in statutory filings or elsewhere. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5362,2 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 23508, at 17,202 (1973); Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,167, at 85,299 (1975). In 1976, however, the SEC formally
withdrew these proposals. See Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,200 (1976). The Commission also issued a statement favoring
disclosure of projections. See Securities Act Release No. 5992, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,756, at 81,034 (Nov. 7, 1978). In order to encourage disclosure, the Commission
proposed a "safe harbor" rule that would arguably protect corporations from liability for reasonably based
projections made in good faith. See Securities Act Release No. 5993, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,757, at 81,041 (Nov. 7, 1978). For a discussion of the proposed rule and an alternative
considered and rejected by the Commission, see Halloran, A Good Safe Harbor Needed to Encourage
Economic Forecasts, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5, 1979, at 29, col. 1.
198. In addition, corporate trading in its own securities with knowledge of its own projections must be
distinguished from the selective disclosure situation. In the former situation, liability under lob-5 should be
imposed if the scienter requirement is met, that is, if the corporation makes its trading decision on the basis
of the projections. In the latter situtation, 10b-5 liability should be imposed because the information that is
selectively disclosed inevitably will be used for trading purposes, and thus the scienter requirement will be
met.
199. The conceptual difficulties that arise from attempting to place projections within the general duty
to disclose has led various commentators to attempt to limit those situations in which projections must be
disclosed. At least one commentator has argued that a corporation must disclose its projections when
trading in its own securities. See Schneider, in FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 191, at 52-53. There
are problems, however, if a corporation has to disclose its projections when trading. For example, this
requirement could extend to corporations that are considered to be trading because they have outstanding
options, warrants, or convertible securities. See Schneider, supra, at 52-53. Contrary to the position taken
in this article that projections are per se material, this approach assumes that projections are material
information for the purpose of triggering a disclosure obligation only when they differ significantly from
the estimates of a corporation's future performance that are generally available in the market and relied
upon by investors. See Ruder, in FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 191, at 14-15, 18-19 (Remarks of
David S. Ruder and Carl W. Schneider). Under this suggested approach, corporate insiders and the
corporation could have to ascertain, before trading in the corporation's securities, what every available
estimate is, and whether each differs materially from the corporation's own internal projections. See Id.
(projections that deal with "what the market expects" not material); Mann, in SEVENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE, supra note 191, at 117-18 (Remarks of Carl W. Schneider) (same); Fleischer, Mundheim &
Murphy, supra note 55, at 842 (same); cf. Mann, supra, at 116 (discussing "materiality" of projection in
light of investor expectations). In this situation it would be unreasonable to subject a corporation to
potential liability for failing to determine the accuracy of outside estimates or for concluding that its own
projections did not vary materially from such estimates, particularly because the corporation did not seek
the outside estimates it had failed to correct.
200. See notes 160-90 supra and accompanying text.
201. See Parker, Ethical Issues for the Financial Analyst, in CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING:
ETHICAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS 165, 167 (1972).
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the corporation, even if the projection itself cannot, the duty to correct would
always arise. By limiting the application of the attribution analysis, the
corporation can be protected from this danger.202
On the other hand, when the projection is not issued by or attributable to
the corporation, a more limited duty to correct should apply. This more
limited duty would be similiar to the requirement now imposed by the
American Stock Exchange, which has relaxed its strict duty to correct rumors
when projections are involved, 203 and which does not ordinarily require a
corporation to respond to outside projections. 204 Only when a projection "is
manifestly based on erroneous information, or is wrongly attributed to a
company source" must a corporation respond.205 Even then, the corporation
need not disclose its own projections; it can limit its response to an
announcement "to the effect that the company itself has made no suach
prediction and currently knows of no facts that would justify making such
prediction." 206
Finally, if there has been a material change in either the projections or their
underlying assumptions, a corporation should be required to correct its own
public projections and any public comments it may make on outside
projections. This duty will arise because the corporation's own previous
disclosure is clearly predictive and will reasonably induce investor reliance on
its accuracy until corrected.
Although no case has decided how such a correction should be made, an
actual situation that did not result in litigation demonstrates a clearly
inadequate approach. In 1973 a large corporation, listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, publicly projected its earnings for the following fiscal
year.207 The projection exceeded actual results by about twenty percent, yet
the corporation did not publicly update its original projection. 208 After the
actual earnings were published, the corporation claimed that it had no duty to
correct because securities analysts who had followed the corporation closely
knew that the corporation's projections were inaccurate, and had corrected
the inaccuracies in their own subsequent projections. 209 The corporation
argued, in effect, that investor reliance on its initial projection was no longer
reasonable once the outside analysts' projections were publicized.210
On these facts, the corporation did not satisfy the duty to correct its
original projection. It could not reasonably assume that investors who had
202. The SEC, while declining to impose on corporations the duty to correct outside projections,
proposed that corporations be permitted to dissociate themselves from such projections. See Securities Act
of 1933 Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,167, at 85,299
(Apr. 28, 1975).
203. See COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 403, at 108-09 (requiring corporation to deny affirmatively
erroneous rumors or reports and to disclose facts to explain situation).
204. Id. at 109. The NYSE does not expressly distinguish between the duty to correct rumors of
projections and the general duty to correct rumors. See COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-23. It
appears from the context of the rule, however, that the requirement of a "frank and explicit announce-
ment" does not apply to projection rumors. Id. But see Schneider, in FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra
note 191, at 51.
205. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 403, at 109.
206. Id.
207. Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1974, at 17, col. 3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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seen and relied on the original projection also had seen the analysts' revised
projections. Furthermore, even if investors were aware of the analysts'
projections, they could not have evaluated the accuracy of those revisions
without a statement by the corporation. The corporation need not have made
its original projection public but, once it did it created a reasonable
expectation on the part of investors that the projections would remain
accurate. It could not then rely on outsiders to satisfy that expectation. The
corporation should have corrected its projection as it would have revised any
other statement.
V. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE AND
LIABILITY UNDER THE EXCHANGE RULES
STOCK EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS
The timely disclosure policies of the New York and American Stock
Exchanges provide the clearest expression of the duty to disclose. Both
exchanges require listed corporations to make prompt disclosure of material
information, which the exchanges define as information likely to have a
significant effect on the market price of the corporation's securities. 211 The
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) does not make the duty a specific part of
the listing agreement, but its Company Manual states that timely disclosure is
considered "one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the
agreement. ' 212 The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) includes the disclo-
sure requirement in both its listing agreement and Company Guide.
213
Both exchanges recognize certain exceptions to the duty to disclose.
Exceptions to the NYSE disclosure requirements are based on the relation-
ship between the materiality of the information and the need for confidentiali-
ty. A company need not disclose highly material information as long as that
information is kept confidential within the corporation and its advisers.
214
When confidentiality cannot be maintained, however, or when it is necessary
to discuss the information with persons outside the corporation, disclosure
must be made on an "immediate release" basis.215 The Company Manual also
provides that disclosure may be delayed when the information is less
significant, although still material, or when an immediate announcement
would endanger the corporation's goals or provide information helpful to
competitors.216 It is unclear, however, whether these exceptions permit
nondisclosure when the information is of the type subject to "immediate
release" and the corporation has a valid business reason for silence but cannot
keep the information confidential.217
211. COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-18; COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.3. The AMEX
further defines "material information" as information that a reasonable investor might consider important
in making his investment decision. COMPANY GUIDE, supra, § 40.3.
212. COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-18. According to the Manual the Exchange recognizes that
"factors bearing upon the public interest, or the exigencies of the market, may necessitate deviation from
even the most explicitly stated policy or requirement." Id. at iii.
213. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.1 & app. 1, at 299.
214. COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-19.
215. Id.
216. Id. at A-22.
217. This issue may be more academic than real because corporations often are able to resolve
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The AMEX sets out its exceptions to the timely disclosure requirement
with greater specificity. Disclosure may be deferred when immediate disclo-
sure would prejudice the corporation's ability to pursue its valid business
objectives or when the facts are changing and confusion would be avoided by
delaying announcement until the information is more definite.2 8 The Ex-
change points out that, in the latter case, successive releases might mislead
rather than enlighten investors.219
The AMEX requirements also suggest the appropriate form for a corpora-
tion's press release. The Exchange stresses that such announcements should
be balanced, fair, and complete, and that they should be written in clear and
succinct language that is comprehensible to an investor.220 The Exchange
suggests that releases be prepared or reviewed by corporate officials familiar
with the information and with the requirements of both the securities laws
and the Exchange rules, and that a corporation establish a permanent group
to prepare all public releases. 221 The Exchange also suggests that legal counsel
review releases. 222
Both exchanges are concerned with adequate dissemination of information.
Although they differ in detail, both require a corporation to deliver its
releases to national financial and general wire services and to major New
York City newspapers.223 In addition, the AMEX suggests that the corpora-
tion send its releases to trade publications and newspapers that circulate in
xareas where the corporation's plants or offices are located. 224 It also recom-
mends that the corporation consider paid advertisements or a letter to
stockholders if information is extremely material or dissemination is unusual-
ly difficult. 225
THEORIES OF LIABILITY UNDER THE EXCHANGE RULES
Two alternative theories of liability premise recovery against listed corpo-
rations on breach of stock exchange disclosure requirements. Although the
1934 Act does not expressly provide a right of action to investors for a breach
of exchange disclosure rules, liability could be implied in accordance with tort
principles governing private rights of action based on statutory violations.226
informally their disclosure problems with Exchange representatives. Indeed, the Exchange recognizes that
literal compliance with its formal policy will not always be possible, and it urges corporations to work with
it in resolving their disclosure problems within the spirit of the listing agreement. Id. at iii.
218. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 403(1), at 104.
219. Id.
220. Id. § 404(a).
221. Id. § 404(c)(1), (2).
222. Id. § 404(c)(3).
223. Id. § 403(2), at 106, 107; COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-24.
224. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 403(2), at 107.
225. Id.
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). The Restatement provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively
or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
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An investor will argue that the duty to disclose is contained in rules of the
exchanges adopted pursuant to the 1934 Act, and that a breach of those rules
constitutes a tort for which a private right of action can be implied.227
Alternatively, if an investor can establish that he is a third party beneficiary of
an exchange's prompt disclosure requirements, relief could be grounded on
traditional state third party beneficiary contract principles. 228
Federal Tort Liability The principal case dealing with implied liability
for breach of a stock exchange rule is Colonial Realty Corporation v. Bache &
Co.,229 in which the Second Circuit stated that in certain cases a federal cause
of action could be implied for the breach of a stock exchange rule by a stock
exchange member.230 The court acknowledged that a right of action could be
implied under tort principles for violations of explicit statutory duties
established by the 1934 Act;231 it found, however, that the Act's concept of
"supervised self-regulation" applicable to the exchanges made it difficult to
apply such principles on an "all-or-nothing basis" to breaches of stock
exchange rules.232 In explaining the nature of this difficulty, the court pointed
out that because the 1934 Act grants broad discretion to the exchanges under
section 6(b) to establish standards and principles for exchange markets, the
"significance and effect of particular rules may vary with the manner of their
adoption and their relationship to provisions and purposes of the statute and
SEC regulations thereunder."2 33 The Second Circuit, relying on the explicit
disciplinary function of the exchanges as a means of protecting investors and
on the absence of any mention of exchange rules in the language of the grant
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967) (citing Restatement (Second) o
Torts § 286) (implying a civil right of action for violation of§ 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 Is in
accordance with general rule of torts); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(citing Restatement, Torts) (implying federal right of action for violation of § 10(b) and rule lob-5 of the
1934 Act); cf. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207,246 (S.D.N.Y.) (implying that private right of action for
alleged violations of Investment Company Act of 1940 is consistent with the doctrine that courts construe
statutes to extent that meaning of the words fairly permits them to effectuate generally expressed legislative
purpose), affd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
227. Implying a private right of action for a breach of the broker-dealers' duty to disclose imposed by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) is based on the same analysis. For a discussion
of arguments in support of private rights of action under NASD rules, see generally Lowenfels, Private
Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
633 (1966).
228. See notes 293-95 infra and accompanying text.
229. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). In this case, Colonial Realty Corporation
was a customer of Bache & Co., a member of the NYSE. Id. at 179. Bache sold securities in Colonial's
margin account, claiming authority to do so under a clause in the standard form margin agreement that
Colonial Realty had signed. Id. Colonial Realty alleged that these sales breached its oral agreement with
Bache not to require margin in excess of the NYSE's minimum requirements, and thereby violated, inter
alia, article XIV of the Constitution of the NYSE. Id. at 179-80.
230. Id. at 182.
231. The court cited as examples of such duties sections 10 and 14 of the 1934 Act. Id. at 181.
232. Id. at 181-82.
233. Id. at 181; see 1934 Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976).
In Colonial Realty the plaintiffs also alleged a violation of the NASD rules under section 15A(b)(8) of
the 1934 Act. 358 F.2d at 180. This article, however, is only concerned with alleged violations of exchange
rules.
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of jurisdiction in the 1934 Act, concluded that Congress did not intend that
violations of all rules adopted under the 1934 Act should give rise to an
implied federal right of action. 234 The court also noted that some exchange
rules discipline members for unethical behavior "which Congress could well
not have intended to give rise to a legal claim. ' 235
At the same time, the court recognized that the concept of "supervised self-
regulation" under the Act is broad enough to encompass those exchange rules
that do provide a basis for implying a private right of action.236 The court
articulated various criteria for determining whether a private right of action
could be implied; these criteria focus on the nature of a rule and its place in
the regulatory scheme.237 A right of action can be implied when an exchange
rule "provides what amounts to a substitute for regulation by the SEC
itself. '238 The court recognized that "notwithstanding the commission's
decision to take a back seat role" in a particular rule's promulgation and
enforcement, such a rule may play an integral part in SEC regulation. 239 The
court provided further guidance by stating that "the case for implication
would be strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the
common law. '240 This standard was designed to ensure that rights of action
implied from violations of exchange rules would not be used to impose new
legal requirements on exchange members conflicting with those standards
long recognized by state law.241
In Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. 242 the Seventh
Circuit, although acknowledging the Colonial Realty approach, 243 adopted a
different test. Under the Buttrey test, a private right of action can be implied
for a breach of a stock exchange rule if the rule violated is designed "for the
234. 358 F.2d at 182.
235. Id. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
236. 358 F.2d at 182.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). In this case, plaintiff was the trustee in
bankruptcy for Dobich Securities Corporation (the bankrupt), which had engaged as a dealer in the sale of
securities. Id. at 136, 141. Michael Dobich, allegedly a financially unstable broker-dealer and speculator in
securities and commodities, organized the bankrupt and was its sole shareholder and principal officer. Id.
at 136, 141. Defendant, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) granted Michael
Dobich's request to open a cash account in the name of the bankrupt without having received any financial
statements, bank references, or credit reports about the bankrupt, and without ascertaining whether the
securities transactions would be for the bankrupt as principal or agent. Id. at 141. At a later date, Merrill
Lynch changed the bankrupt's account to a margin account without investigating the bankrupt's financial
ability, and permitted the defendant Michael Dobich to engage in large speculative stock transactions for
the bankrupt. These transactions resulted in substantial losses and ultimately insolvency. Id. The plaintiff
alleged that Merrill Lynch knew that the money used by Michael Dobich in these transactions belonged to
its customers, and that the money was fraudulently converted. Id.
The Seventh Circuit upheld a private right of action based on an alleged violation of NYSE rule 405, the
"know your customer rule," which requires a member to use due diligence "to learn the essential facts
relative to every customer." Id. at 137, 143.
243. Id. at 142. The court noted the "plays an integral part in SEC regulation" standard but did not
make mention of the "unknown to the common law" prong. Id.
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direct protection" of investors244 and if the conduct by the exchange member
giving rise to the violation was "tantamount to fraud." 245
This test does not improve upon the criteria set forth in Colonial Realty.
First, the "direct protection of investors" standard offers little limitation;
arguably every exchange rule is designed to provide such protection. 246
Further, the "tantamount to fraud" requirement does not provide a logical
limitation. Under this test it can be determined whether an action should be
implied only after a case has been tried.247 To determine whether fraud exists,
the court must examine the conduct under attack rather than the rule itself. If
the breach of an exchange rule gives rise to an implied right of action, it
should do so in all cases regardless of the nature of the conduct; the nature of
the conduct is more appropriately an element of the offense and not a
jurisdictional basis for the cause of action.248 For these reasons the Buttrey test
is not as useful as the test set forth in Colonial Realty for determining which
exchange rules, when violated, should give rise to a private right of action.249
244. Id.
245. Id. at 143.
246. The standard does not provide guidance "for determining whether or not the violation of a
particular rule is actionable." Id. at 142; see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d
Cir.) (Congress did not intend violations of all rules to give rise to civil claims), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966); notes 229-41 infra and accompanying text.
247. See 410 F.2d at 143 (ackowledging that determination whether violations of rule 405 justify
imposition of liability cannot be made until the case is actually tried); Nelson v. Hench, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,085, at 91,907 (D. Minn. 1977) (because determination of
fraud required before subject matter jurisdiction could be determined, Buttrey standard would result in
excessive litigation); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 95,777, at 90,809 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (tantamount to fraud approach promotes excessive federal actions
because courts forced to hear a case on merits before it can decide motion to dismiss).
248. See Nelson v. Hench, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,085, at 91,907
(D. Minn. 1977) (if private right of action depends upon individual conduct rather than nature of rule in
question, result may be that violation of same rule may not consistently give rise to cause of action); Zagari
v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809 (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (if private right of action exists, it exists for all violations of rule, regardless of specific conduct).
249. This conclusion is supported by at least two district court decisions. See Nelson v. Hench, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,085, at 91,907-08 (D. Minn. 1977) (rejecting Buttrey
test; adopting Colonial Realty test); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,977, at 90,809-10 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (same).
Since Judge Friendly's opinion in Colonial Realty, the Supreme Court has twice addressed the issue of
implied rights of action under federal statutes. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), a unanimous Court
enunciated four criteria that must be considered before implying a right of action: 1) whether plaintiff is a
member of a class for whose special benefit Congress enacted the statute; 2) whether there is any explicit or
implicit legislative intent implying or denying a private remedy; 3) whether a private right is consistent
with the legislative scheme; and 4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state laws
such that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based exclusively on federal law. Id. at 78. In
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1970), the Supreme Court applied the four criteria articulated in
Cort. 430 U.S. at 37-41. The Court in dicta, however, went beyond the holding in Cort in suggesting that
unless it can be shown that an implied right of action is necessary to accomplish the legislative intent of the
statute in question a right will not be implied. Id. at 38, 41. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
the criteria developed in Cort and followed in Piper apply in determining whether there is an implied
federal right of action under the exchange rules.
To the extent Colonial Realty may conflict with Cort and Piper, it can be distinguished on the ground
that the implied right was based on the exchange rules, whereas in both Cort and Piper the claims were
based directly on violations of federal statutes. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 4 (claim
under the Williams Act); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 68 (claim under 18 U.S.C. § 610). Even if Cori and Piper
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Colonial Realty and Buttrey establish that a private right of action may be
implied against a member of a stock exchange for violation of some stock
exchange rules. To impose liability for the breach of a corporation's duty to
disclose under exchange rules, however, this principle would have to be
extended to the corporation whose securities are listed on the exchange. To do
so, it would be necessary to establish that the duty to disclose was imposed by
a rule of the exchange and that the rule was one of those covered by the
Colonial Realty test.
The question of a corporation's liability for violation of a stock exchange
rule was raised recently in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. 250 In that case, the
plaintiffs, debenture holders who had failed to convert their debentures prior
to redemption, alleged that Boeing had failed to give adequate notice of the
redemption as required under its listing agreement with the NYSE. 251
Plaintiffs further claimed that Boeing was civilly liable under federal law for
violation of the NYSE listing agreement because the agreement requirements
"are an extension of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and an integral part
of the statutory scheme under which exchanges are required to adopt rules
.. .the violation of which may give rise to a civil action under federal
laws." 2 52
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint for
failure to state a federal cause of action, the Second Circuit held that the
listing agreement and the Company Manual were "instruments corresponding
to a rule" of the NYSE within section 6 of the 1934 Act, even though the
Exchange had not so designated. 253 The court acknowledged tliat it had
previously held that a violation of an exchange rule did not givd rise to a
federal cause of action against a listed company. 254 The court stated however,
are applicable, two courts have held that the Colonial Realty test is consistent with the criteria set forth in
Cort. See Nelson v. Hench, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,085, at 91,907 (D.
Minn. 1977) (Cort implicitly confirms Colonial Reality); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) % 95,777, at 90,809 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Colonial Realty test encompasses
first Cort factor and deals directly with remaining three).
250. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
251. Id. at 1374-75. The listing agreement had been incorporated by reference into the listing application
filed by Boeing in connection with the debenture issue. Id. at 1396. The pertinent part of the listing
agreement provided:
The Corporation will publish immediately to the holders of any of its securities listed on the
Exchange any action taken by the Corporation with respect to dividends or to the allotment of
rights to subscribe or to any rights or benefits pertaining to the ownership of its securities
listed on the Exchange; and will give prompt notice to the Exchange of any such action; and
will afford the holders of its securities listed on the Exchange a proper period within which to
record their interests and to exercise their rights.
Id. (citing NYSE listing agreement Part III, Paragraph 4).
252. Id. at 1379.
253. Id. at 1380 (citing 1934 Act, § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (1970)) (Exchange's articles of
incorporation, bylaws, rules, or instruments corresponding thereto to be referred to as "rules of the
exchange"). The Second Circuit defined what was required by the listing agreement by referring to section
A-10 of the Company Manual, which sets forth specifically the requirements necessary to ensure adequate
notice in the event of a redemption. Id. at 1376.
254. Id. at 1380. In O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), plaintiffs filed a derivative suit
alleging violation of the 1934 Act and the Federal Aviation Act. After the complaint was dismissed,
plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to allege that the transaction violated the rules of the
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that its own most recent statements and developing case law had recognized
that a private right of action might be appropriate in some circumstances, 255
and suggested that its prior holding had been implicitly overruled. The court
also found that the legislative history of the 1934 Act was at best ambiguous
whether Congress intended to insulate corporations from liability for viola-
tions of a stock exchange rule.256 The Second Circuit, however, rejected the
argument that delisting was the exclusive remedy for corporate breaches of
exchange rules and held that the plaintiffs claim was sufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction.257
Although the court it Van Gemert found Boeing liable for having failed to
provide adequate notice of redemption, the court based its finding of liability
on the contract between the debenture holders and Boeing,258 and used the
claim of an implied federal private right of action only to support pendentjurisdiction.2 59 As a result, the court's analysis has little utility in determining
whether a breach of the exchanges' duty to disclose gives rise to an implied
private right of action.260 Thus, even if Van Gemert establishes that a claim
based on an alleged violation of an exchange rule by a listed corporation is
sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, it is still necessary to apply the
Colonial Realty test to determine whether a cause of action should be implied
in any particular case.
Applying the test to the exchanges' duty to disclose, it is apparent that the
first prong-that the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common
law-is satisfied. At common law, there was no duty to disclose even to
persons engaged in securities transactions;2 61 a duty to disclose arose only if
"special facts" surrounding the transaction dictated disclosure.262
NYSE. Id. at 770. The court stated that although a private action could be maintained against the NYSE
for the failure to enforce its own rules, "it does not follow. . . that a suit against a listed company or its
officers based on a violation of an exchange rule arises under federal law, and we see no reason for so
holding." Id.
255. Id. at 1380-81 (citing, inter alia, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co., 385 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1964)).
256. Id. at 1382.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1383.
259. Id. at 1382 & n.19 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
260. Although the court suggests that an action should not be implied for the breach of every provision
of the listing agreement, the court did not provide any clear guidance on how to determine which
provisions would give rise to a cause of action. See id. at 1382 n. 18 (provision requiring prompt notification
to Exchange of changes of officers or directors would not give rise to liability).
261. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 361-62, 186 N.E.
659, 660-61 (1933).
Although courts have not yet applied the "unknown to the common law" test to violations of exchange
disclosure requirements, courts have applied this prong to other exchange rules. In Zagari v. Dean Witter
& Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the
court refused to imply a private right of action of an alleged violation of the "know your customer" rule of
the AMEX. Id. at 90,811-12. The court held that the standard of due diligence imposed by the rule was
part of the common law concept of negligence and that the duty imposed on a member firm to supervise the
activities of its salesmen existed under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. The court
concluded that the exchange rule further defined common law principles and did not impose duties
unknown to the common law. Id. at 90,812. See also Nelson v. Hench, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,085, at 91,908 (D. Minn. 1977) (refusing to imply private right of action for
violation of "know your customer" rule of NYSE and NASD).
262. See, eg., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (duty to disclose exists when director's agent
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The second prong of the test-the substitute for SEC regulation require-
ment-is more difficult to apply. In Colonial Realty the court cited as an
example of a substitute regulation an instance in which the SEC terminated its
own rulemaking proceeding upon the adoption of an exchange rule.263 The
court, however, did not suggest that to meet this requirement the exchange
rule must be identical to or coextensive with what the SEC would have
required in a rule of its own.2 64 All that need be shown is that the SEC
considers the exchange rule to be a satisfactory substitute for its own rule.2 65
Difficulties still exist in applying this latter test. There is some evidence
that the SEC views the exchanges' disclosure requirements as a substitute for
its own rule. The SEC, in statements concerning the duty to make prompt
disclosure, has emphasized the significance of the exchanges' requirements.266
Additionally, that the SEC has not adopted a rule requiring prompt
disclosure, although it has the authority to do so under sections 10(b) and 13
purchases stock from shareholder's agent); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 362, 186 N.E. 659, 660-61
(1933) (relief may be granted when director personally purchases shares from stockholder without
disclosing material facts within his peculiar knowledge); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 536-37, 16
P.2d 531, 534-35 (1932) (director purchasing stocks directly from shareholder under duty to disclose).
There appear to be no reported cases imposing a duty to disclose by a person not engaged in such
transactions.
263. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966). A more recent example of an exchange rule that would presumably meet the second prong is the
amendment to the NYSE listing agreement requiring all listed corporations to establish an audit
committee. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
13346, (March 9, 1977) (approving rule change). Although the SEC had not yet commenced its own
rulemaking proceeding, the Exchange adopted the amendment at the SEC's urging, presumably to forestall
a similar SEC rule. See id. at 4 n.9 (SEC urged formation of audit committees).
In Colonial Realty the court suggested that those provisions of former section 19 of the 1934 Act that
explicitly authorized the SEC to modify exchange rules might provide a basis for implying a private right of
action for violations of those rules. 358 F.2d at 182; see 1934 Act, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970)
(delineating specific areas of SEC power to modify exchange rules). In 1975, however, the Securities Acts
Amendments repealed section 19(b) and gave the SEC plenary power to modify any exchange rule. 1934
Act, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976). The effect of the amendments on the second prong of the test is
unclear because the statute specifically states that any amendment to the rules of a self-regulatory
organization made by the Commission shall not be considered a rule of the Commission. Id. § 78s(c)(4)(C).
264. Because any SEC rule would apply to all corporations rather than just those whose securities are
listed on a national securities exchange, the exchange's requirements clearly are not a complete substitute
for SEC regulation. It is possible that the SEC has not adopted a rule because it believes that its own
statements, together with the requirements of the exchanges, adequately govern the conduct of most
corporations.
265. It has been argued that the criteria governing whether an exchange rule can be considered a
substitute for SEC regulation should be whether the rule is either specifically required by SEC rules or is
traceable to particular statutory provisions. See Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability
for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1120, 1136-39 (1970). Under this standard,
because neither section 10(b) of the 1934 Act nor rule lOb-5 specifically impose the duty to disclose, the
exchanges' timely disclosure requirement would fail the second prong of the Colonial Realty test.
266. The SEC has stated that "[i]t seems clear, moreover, that an exchange has an obligation, in the
exercise of its self-regulatory responsibilities, to assure, as far as is possible, that the issuers of securities
traded on it make prompt and accurate disclosure of material corporate developments." In re Intercon-
tinental Indus., Inc., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8858, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) S 77,827, at 83,911 (April 3, 1970). See SEC Comment on Timely Disclosure of
Material Corporate Developments, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. Rae. (CCH) % 77,915, at 80,035-36 (Oct. 15, 1970) (SEC policy of prompt disclosure is
embodied in rules and directives of exchanges); cf SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12
(2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (dictum) (timing of disclosure normally a matter of business judgement but must
fall within parameters established in SEC and exchange requirements), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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of the 1934 Act, lendg further support to the conclusion that the second prong
could be met.267
The exchanges' own view of their prompt disclosure requirements, how-
ever, is somewhat different. A representative of the NYSE has stated that its
disclosure requirements are "more of a common sense guideline to ethical
behavior than a legal document" because they are intended to help corpora-
tions solve disclosure problems to which there is no one correct answer.268
The AMEX, moreover, acknowledges that the disclosures it requires fre-
quently "must be more prompt and comprehensive than is required by the
securities laws. ' 269 The AMEX, however, also acknowledges that its disclo-
sure policy has been "refined and expanded to meet changing circumstances,"
and "reflects recent interpretations of the federal securities laws. '270 The
latter language may indicate that the Exchange views its policy as an integral
part of the regulatory scheme. Furthermore, the former language can be read
as referring only to the relationship between the Exchange's policy and the
SEC's statutory reporting requirements. If this interpretation is correct, the
Exchange's policy would satisfy the second prong of the Colonial Realty test.
Absent clearer language from either the SEC or the exchanges, however, it is
difficult to draw a firm conclusion about whether the substitution prong of
the test is met.
Even if the exchanges' duty to disclose satisfies the Colonial Realty test,
there still may not be civil liability for a breach of that duty.271 Jurisdiction for
267. The Wheat Report rejected such a rule because it would be "unduly burdensome for the timely
disclosure policies of the self-regulatory organizations to be duplicated." WHEAT REPORTsupra note 52, at
329. The Wheat Report also concluded that the SEC's statutory reporting requirements play a different role
in the overall regulatory scheme than that of a timely disclosure policy.
[The former] are not intended to, nor could they adequately, duplicate the timely disclosure
policies of the self-regulatory agencies. Commission requirements act to a degree as a
backstop for those policies; they operate to encourage willingness on the part of issuers to
keep the market place informed. They provide details which may be overlooked in the
preparation of a news release or may not be included in a published news report.
Id. at 332; see Feuerstein, The Corporation's Obligations of Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws
When it is Not Trading in its Stock, 15 N.Y.L.F. 385, 392 (1969) (self-regulatory bodies play different role
than SEC in enforcement of timely disclosure requirements; informal procedures of self-regulatory bodies
are preferable in this area).
268. West, Timely Disclosure-The View From 11 Wall S!reet, 24 Sw. L.J. 241, 241 (1970).
269. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 401.
270. Id.
271. Even if civil liability does not exist, a corporation is still subject to sanctions imposed by the
exchanges for breach of their duty to disclose. Both exchanges have the discretionary power to suspend
trading. See COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, § 1002 (policies with respect to continued listing); COMPANY
MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-291,-294 (numerical and other criteria with respect to continued listing).
Suspensions, however, are used only occasionally to compel disclosure from a recalcitrant corporation;
they are more commonly used to give investors adequate time to evaluate the significance of a corporation's
unexpected, though voluntary, disclosure.
Both exchanges can also delist a corporation's securities if the corporation fails to comply with the
listing agreement. Id. The exchanges have used this power sparingly, however. Only one case exists in
which an exchange delisted a corporation's securities because the corporation failed to comply with the
exchange's timely disclosure policy, and in that case the Exchange apparently based its delisting on the
dissemination of false information rather than on complete nondisclosure. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v.
American Stock Exchange, 452 F.2d 935,937, 938 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); see
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such liability would be premised on the fact that the duty was imposed by the
listing agreement, which is itself a rule or an "instrument corresponding to a
rule" of the exchange pursuant to the 1934 Act.272 In the case of the AMEX,
this premise is correct; its timely disclosure policy is specifically incorporated
in its listing agreements. 273
On the other hand, although the NYSE has characterized its timely
disclosure requirement as "one of the most important and fundamental
purposes of the listing agreement, 2 74 the requirement is not in the agreement
itself. Rather, it is contained in the Company Manual,275 the guide for listed
corporations published by the Exchange. The Company Manual does not
purport to establish firm rules; indeed, the manual notes that in all but routine
matters, deviation from its requirements may be necessary. 276 Although the
Exchange urges compliance with the Company Manual because its provisions
are "indicative of current concepts of good practice, 2 77 neither the listing
agreement nor the manual itself requires listed corporations to comply with
the Company Manual. Thus, the Exchange appears to have carefully created a
structure whereby the duty to disclose is neither a part of an Exchange rule
nor an "instrument corresponding to a rule, ' 278 and whereby a breach of the
duty may result in Exchange sanctions but not civil liability.
This difficulty may have been eliminated by the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975.279 Under these amendments, a rule of the exchange is defined
to include such stated policies, practices, and interpretations as the Commis-
sion, by rule, determines in the public interest to be deemed rules.280 Rule 19b-
4, which establishes the procedures to be followed in connection with changes
in exchange rules, defines "stated policies, practices and interpretations" to
include "any statement made generally available to . . .persons having or
seeking access. . . to facilities" of the exchange.281 The SEC has stated that,
In re Intercontinental Indus. Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8858, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) i 77,827 (April 3, 1970) (granting Exchange's delisting application
based on corporation's dissemination of materially misleading information).
272. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1380-82 (2d Cir.) (listing agreement is an
instrument corresponding to rules of exchange within § 6(a)(3) of the 1934 Act; claim under listing
agreement sufficient for jurisdictional purposes), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
273. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 8, app., at 299 (listing agreement Form L requiring prompt public
disclosure of material information).
274. COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-18.
275. See id. at A-18,-21 (Timely Disclosure section).
276. Id. at iii.
277. Id. at A-33. The SEC has described the Company Manual as "a guide for listed companies," the
enforcement of which stems "from the power of the board of governors to suspend or delist securities."
SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
part 4, at 566 (1963).
278. But see Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1380 (2d Cir.) (Company Manual is an
"instrument corresponding to a rule"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). In Van Gemert, however, the
relevant provisions of the Company Manual related directly to a specific obligation in the listing agreement.
See id. at 1376 (Company Manual specifically defines what constitutes adequate notice). Thus the court
was able to read the Company Manual as being part of that obligation. Id. The timely disclosure policy, by
contrast, does not relate to a specific provision in the listing agreement; hence, it may be more difficult to
link the Company Manual and the listing agreement to establish jurisdiction.
279. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3, 89 Stat. 97 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(1970)).
280. 1934 Act, §§ 3(a)(27), (28), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c (a)(27), (28) (1976).
281. Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(b) (1978).
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in the case of an exchange, the term "persons" includes issuers of securities
listed on the exchange. 282 Under rule 19b-4, however, an exchange can notify
the Commission that a particular stated policy, practice, or interpretation is
not a rule of the exchange. 283 Thus, under the existing statutory scheme, it
appears that the SEC could deem the Company Manual to be a rule of the
NYSE, while the Exchange could notify the Commission that the Company
Manual is not a rule.
To date, it appears that neither the SEC nor the NYSE has taken any
action with respect to the status of the Company Manual. In its review of
existing exchange rules to determine whether they comply with the 1975
Amendments, the SEC did not refer to the Company Manual.284 It cautioned,
however, that its comments on some exchange rules did not imply that all
other such rules were in compliance, and expressed no opinion on the status
under the Act of documents such as the Company Manual.285
An additional problem with implying this right of action for breach of the
NYSE's duty to disclose is that some parts of that duty impose a greater
obligation on the corporation than would rule lOb-5. For example, the NYSE
requires a corporation to confirm an accurate rumor "despite the business
inconvenience which may be caused and even though the matter may not yet
have been presented to the company's Board of Directors for considera-
tion. '286 Thus, under the facts in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,287 had a
rumor concerning the initial drill hole been circulated, the NYSE would have
required confirmation even though there was a valid business reason for
silence.288 In such a case, the failure to correct would not give rise to liability
under rule lOb-5 but could result in liability if a cause of action were to be
implied for breach of the Exchange's requirement. This would be an
undesirable result because it undercuts the balance that rule lOb-5 strikes
between the needs of investors and those of the corporation, and it forces the
corporation to choose between civil liability for failure to correct the rumor
and economic loss resulting from disclosure. It is precisely the type of
situation in which exchange action against the corporation might be appropri-
ate but civil liability would not.
State Third Party Beneficiary Contract Liability An alternative theory
of liability for violating the exchanges' duty to disclose is based on state law
third party beneficiary contract principles. Under this theory, an investor
would allege that he is the beneficiary of the corporation's promise to the
exchange to disclose material information. Support for this theory might be
found in Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange,289 in which an investor
282. Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
11604, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 80,267, at 85,568-69 (Aug. 19, 1975).
283. Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1978).
284. Rules of Self-Regulatory Organizations; Section 3 1(b) Review, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 13027, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCII) 80,814, at 87,139 (Nov. 30,
1976).
285. Id. at 87,141.
286. COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8, at A-23.
287. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
288. This conclusion assumes that the corporation had been unable to convince the Exchange of its need
for silence.
289. 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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sought to hold the exchange liable to him on the grounds that he was a third
party beneficiary of a contract between the Exchange and the SEC.290 The
court held in Weinberger that the investor was more than an incidental
beneficiary of this contract and on this basis denied the Exchange's motion to
dismiss the complaint. 291 Thus, an independent basis for relief was found in
state contract law. Although the relevant contract in Weinberger was between
an exchange and a government agency, the same reasoning should apply to a
private agreement between a corporation and an exchange if the third party
can demonstrate that the exchange's disclosure requirements were intended to
benefit investors.292
To recover as a third party beneficiary, an investor must establish that a
promise to make timely disclosure of material information exists; that he is an
intended, rather than an incidental, beneficiary of the promise; that recogni-
tion of the right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effect the
intent of the parties; and that the promisee-the exchange-intended to give
the investor the benefit of the promised performance.293
In seeking to establish these elements, an investor faces problems similar to
those that arise in attempting to imply a federal private right of action for a
violation of the exchanges' timely disclosure requirement. For example,
because the NYSE's listii., agreement contains no direct promise to disclose,
an investor would have to prove that the listing agreement should be reformed
to include the timely disclosure provisions of the Company Manual.294 An
investor would also have considerable difficulty in demonstrating that he was
the intended beneficiary of the promise to disclose because the NYSE has
290. Id. at 140. The investor relied on an agreement filed by the Exchange pursuant to section 6(a)(1) of
the 1934 Act by which the exchange undertook to comply and to enforce compliance by its members with
the provisions and rules of the 1934 Act. Id. at 141. The court rejected the Exchange's argument that the
agreement was "nothing more than a condition precedent to a license to engage in a particular business,"
and held that the agreement was a contract. Id. at 144-45.
291. Id. at 144, 146. The court applied the general rule that permits third party recovery under a
government contract if the parties to the contract intended that the promisor would compensate members
of the public for injurious consequences. Id. at 143 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145 (1932)).
In determining that the contract was for the benefit of investors, the court relied on Baird v. Franklin, in
which the Second Circuit found congressional intent to provide a remedy for the Exchange's breach of its
duty to supervise its member firms. 335 F. Supp. at 144; see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.)
(exchange's violation of the statutory duty to regulate its member firms gave rise to a private cause of
action; unnecessary to pass upon alternate ground of third party beneficiary contract principles), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 737 (1944).
292. In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975), plaintiffs
alleged that they were third party beneficiaries to the listing agreement between the NYSE and Boeing. Id.
at 1380. Judge Oakes alone found merit in this claim, stating that under the third party beneficiary theory
the result would be "essentially coterminous" with that reached by implying a federal cause of action. Id. at
1382 n.19 (Oakes, J., writing for the majority, but noting his individual view on this issue). But see 89
HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1024 (1976) (exchange's apparent acceptance of Boeing's notice presumably
terminated any contractual rights of debenture holders).
293. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1973). The Restatement suggests that the
intent of the parties may be disregarded in some cases when the statute embodies an "overriding policy"
requiring recognition of the rights of third party beneficiaries. Id. § 133, Comment (d). An example given
in the Comment is that of a collective bargaining agreement between a labor union and an employer in
which the employer promises not to discriminate against any employee because of his membership in the
labor union. Id. § 133, Comment (d), Illustration 13. Of course the statutory basis for the union members'
rights and their relationship to the contracting parties is more direct than that of investors as third party
beneficiaries of the contract between the corporation and the exchange.
294. See note 275 supra and accompanying text.
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specifically indicated that its timely disclosure requirement is not intended to
give rise to legal liability.295
On balance, then, it will be difficult for an investor to recover if the
corporation breaches the stock exchanges' timely disclosure requirements.
Such requirements may not satisfy the criteria required to imply a private
right of action under the federal securities laws. Additionally, it will be hard
for an investor to establish that he is an intended beneficiary of the
corporation's promise to disclose, as would be required under state common
law third party beneficiary principles.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that rule lOb-5 is an appropriate vehicle for the
imposition of new disclosure obligations. Existing restrictions on insider
trading provide some incentive for disclosure of material information, but are
insufficient to promote the full disclosure that investors need. These restric-
tions apply to insiders only; they do not obligate a corporation to speak. Only
a disclosure duty that applies irrespective of trading will fully meet the
informational needs of investors.
At the same time, the duty to disclose will constitute only part of a
carefully constructed disclosure system consisting of statutory requirements,
rules, forms, and interpretations administered by the SEC and the self-
regulatory organizations. To be effective, the duty must be synchronized with
the system so as to provide a meaningful benefit to investors without imposing
an unfair burden on corporations.
The skeleton of the duty is simple: A corporation must promptly disclose
all material information. Putting flesh on the skeleton is a more complex task,
and one that requires balancing a corporation's need for silence against
investors' need for disclosure. In essence, the duty to disclose demands that a
295. See note 268 supra and accompanying text.
Apparently, the only reported state case dealing with the application of third party beneficiary
principles to a breach of the listing-agreement is Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d
318 (1948). In that case, the corporation had allegedly breached its listing agreement by failing to promptly
publish news of the omission of its quarterly dividend. Id. at 54, 57 A.2d at 319. Plaintiff, an existing
stockholder, had placed an order to buy additional shares that was executed at a price higher than that
which the stock actually traded after there had been full dissemination of the news. Id. at 55, 57 A.2d at
320. The plaintiff alleged that she would have cancelled her order if the corporation had announced the
dividend omission before the opening of the market. Id. The court held, however, that the listing agreement
was intended only for the benefit of actual stockholders and that plaintiffcould not recover because her loss
arose in her capacity as an investor rather than as a stockholder. Id. at 58, 57 A.2d at 321. In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated:
In order to recover, it is essential that the beneficiary shall be the real promisee; i.e., that the
promise shall be made to him in fact, though not in form. It is not enough that the contract
may operate to his benefit. It must clearly appear that the parties intended to recognize him as
the primary party in interest and as privy to the promise.
Id.
The Mackubin holding is questionable because the court failed to analyze the statutory background of
the listing agreement. In addition, its narrow interpretation of third party beneficiary principles is not
generally accepted. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1973) (generally accepted
standard).
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corporation attempt to communicate clearly and quickly with investors.
Thus, a corporation must act promptly in gathering and evaluating material
information. It must also use its best efforts to prepare its disclosure in an
understandable fashion and to disseminate the information where needed. To
date, no court has held that a corporation has a legal obligation to
communicate clearly or to disseminate accurately. These are significant
aspects of the full disclosure process, however, and it is appropriate to
embody them in the duty imposed by rule lOb-5.
Because of the complexities involved in achieving full and prompt disclo-
sure the duty must be reasonably interpreted. When information is too
uncertain for meaningful disclosure, when a corporation has a valid business
reason for nondisclosure, or when the media fail to publish a release issued by
a corporation, it would be unreasonable to impose liability on a corporation
for its failure to make prompt disclosure. Therefore, the standard for
measuring whether a corporation has breached its duty must focus on the
corporation's good faith efforts to satisfy its disclosure obligations, even if
those efforts do not always meet with success. The corporation that has made
such an effort should be protected from liability.
As part of the general duty to disclose, a special disclosure obligation arises
when previously disclosed material information has become inaccurate
because of subsequent events. This duty to update arises if both the original
and the revised information are material and the investors' continued reliance
on the accuracy of the original statement is reasonable. In order to make this
latter determination, courts must consider how predictive the initial disclo-
sure is, the time lapse between the original disclosure and the subsequent
event, and the availability of the new information to the investing public.
Similarly, in some situations a corporation will have an obligation to
correct public misstatements made by others. Because a corporation cannot
reasonably guarantee the accuracy of all publicly available information, the
duty to correct must also be circumscribed. The duty arises only. when a
misstatement is made by an outsider who has a special relationship with the
corporation, or by a corporate officer who speaks on behalf of the corporation
or with apparent authority to do so. With respect to the latter case, however,
the duty will turn on the position of the person who made the misstatement,
the existence of corporate procedures designed to guard against such
misstatements, and the extent of its dissemination.
In order to secure redress for injury due to nondisclosure, an investor
might attempt to proceed against listed corporations for breach of stock
exchange disclosure requirements. Establishing liability under this theory,
however, requires overcoming a number of substantial obstacles. The 1934
Act provides no express remedy for such a breach and the exchange
requirements alone may not sustain an implied cause of action.296 An investor
also would have difficulty proving that he was the intended third party
beneficiary of the corporation's promise to disclose, as would be required
under state contract law 1principles. Because of these barriers, rule lOb-5
provides a preferable basis for the duty to disclose. To recover for breach of
the duty under rule lOb-5, a plaintiff would have to meet several strict
296. See notes 226-95 supra and accompanying text.
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requirements. 297 An injured investor is more likely to meet these established
tests under rule 10b-5. however, than to convince a court to accept a new
cause of action under the stock exchange rules.
The SEC, the stock exchanges, the courts, and commentators have all
discussed the duty to disclose. This discussion, however, has generated
strikingly little litigation. Perhaps because of the absence of litigation, many
difficult questions that corporations frequently encounter and that this article
has addressed remain unanswered. It would be appropriate, therefore, for the
SEC to express its views on these disclosure issues through rules or guidelines,
rather than to leave the answers entirely to the courts. The drafting of an
appropriate rule or guideline is a particularly difficult task, however, because
it involves defining a valid business purpose for nondisclosure. 298 Neverthe-
less, the SEC has the responsibility of interpreting duties imposed by the
securities laws and can provide more guidance and notice to businesses
regarding proper conduct by establishing rules and guidelines than by
instituting enforcement actions.299
The duty to disclose will not be a panacea for investors. It will not produce
large amounts of previously undisclosed information. By making disclosure
more timely and the disclosed information more comprehensible, however, it
will improve the process of providing material information to investors.
Finally, this duty to disclose is consistent with the efforts of those concerned
with improving the present disclosure system, and is consonant with the
underlying policies of the federal securities laws.
297. See notes 16 & 18 supra.
298. The SEC has traditionally shied away from defining certain types of frauds in a manner that would
specify the full range of prohibited conduct without encompassing legitimate activity. Cohen, Book
Review, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 399, 406 (1968). In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the court suggested that
the SEC adopt a rule dealing with the permissible timing of insider transactions after disclosure, a
suggestion upon which the SEC has not acted. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18
(2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). But see ALI, FED. SEC. CODE § 265 (Proposed
Official Draft, Mar. 15, 1978) (definition of "generally available"-fact that has been publicly disclosed for
at least one week).
299. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Report of the SEC Major Issues Conference 2
(Jan. 13-15, 1977).
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